46 Waltz, TIP, pp. 89–93, quoting p. 89. On Waltz and analogy, see Charles Jones,
‘Rethinking the methodology of realism’, in Barry Buzan, Charles A. Jones and Richard
Little,The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism(New York: Columbia
University Press, 1993), pp. 178–99.
47 Waltz, TIP, pp. 89, 90.
48 Waltz, TIP, p. 91. Also see Jones, ‘Rethinking the methodology of realism’, p. 195.
49 See further Nicholas Onuf, ‘Institutions, intentions and International Relations’, Review
of International Studies, 28 (2), 2002, pp. 211–28.
50 John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Continuity and transformation in the world polity: toward a
neorealist synthesis’, reprinted in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, pp. 131–57.
51 See especially Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds),State Sovereignty as a Social
Construct(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
52 I should be clear that I am endorsing the way Waltz’s model can be enhanced, and not
Waltz’s model, whether enhanced or not. See World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in
Social Theory and International Relations(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1989), part II, for the structural model I prefer.
53 Waltz, TIP, p. 92.
54 Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations, p. 97, quoting Waltz, ‘Reflections on
Theory of International Politics’, p. 343.
55 Wendt,Social Theory of International Politics, p. 51. See generally ch. 2.
56 Milja Kurki has suggested that positivists, being ‘at their core empiricists’ (or
phenomenalists, see below), believe that ‘reality consists literally of ourobservations’ and
therefore do not accept proposition 1 (personal communication). I would say instead that
positivists, even Humean sceptics, are empirical realists: our observations represent reality
insofar as they work for us.
57 See, for example, Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba,Designing Social
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994), pp. 109–10.
58 Robert O. Keohane, ‘Realism, neorealism and the study of world politics’, in Keohane,
Neorealism and its Critics, p. 12; two references deleted.
59 Kurki, Causation in International Relations, p. 112.
60 Waltz, TIP, p. 89; two references deleted. Waltz probably meant nineteenth century.
61 Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior(Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976).
62 Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics(Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1953), p. 23.
63 Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, p. 32.
64 Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg, ‘Interview with Ken Waltz’, Review of International
Studies, 24( 3), 1998, p. 380.
65 ‘Reflections on Theory of International Politics’, p. 336.
66 Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, p. 32.
67 Aristotle, TopicsI, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, 103b20–23. In Categories, trans.
J. L. Ackrill,1b25, Aristotle used the term substance(ousia, not be confused with matter,
hule ̄) to lead off the list. See Barnes, The Complete Works of Aristotle, I, p. 172, 4.
68 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St
Martin’s, 1965), pp. 65–66.
69 On space and time, see Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 67–91; on the pure concepts of
synthesis, or categories, see pp. 111–19.
70 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 133–38, 180–87, quoting 134, 184.
71 Joseph coined this formula, and characterized Waltz’s model as phenomenalist, in
discussion of my presentation at Aberystwyth (I offered ‘models all the way back’ as an
alternative formula). I have also relied on a personal communication from him.
72 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics,pp. 109–13, 130–35.
73 Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, pp. 37–38, his emphasis; also see p. 40, and see
further my Republican Legacy in International Thought(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Structure? What structure? 105