ranks high on the globalization index,^50 holding place 7 in front of such countries
as Germany and France. Finally, at the level of community there is a strong sense
of common identity (both at the mass and the elite level) across the Atlantic, based
on common values of liberal democracy, human rights, constitutional government,
and market economies based on private property.^51
All this matters little to structural realist analysis because they are all changes in
and not ofthe system. Sovereign autonomy remains in place, so does anarchy, self-
help, and the security dilemma. The view taken here, by contrast, is that changes
in statehood imply systemic changes and changes in security dilemmas as well. Both
the anarchic environment and the related security dilemma have particular features
in the case of weak states and in the case of postmodern states. None of this plays a
role in structural realist theory but they are a big and important thing for our
understanding of where the world is headed.
Anarchy and security dilemmas in weak states and in
postmodern states
Weak postcolonial states do not face an international anarchy of self-help and mortal
danger; they would be completely unable to survive under such conditions. In
context of decolonization, weak states were exempted from that classical security
dilemma. They do not face external threats that amount to a matter of life and death
for the state. In general, both states and regimes are protected by international norms,
backed by the great powers. There is a strong ‘territorial integrity norm’ – that is,
‘the proscription that force should not be used to alter interstate boundaries’,^52 which
in a sense is a life insurance for weak states. Recolonization, annexation or any other
format by which stronger states could take over weaker ones is out of the question.
This does not guarantee that outsiders will refrain from pursuing their interests
in weak states, of course; they did so during the Cold War, sometimes through
intervention, and have done so later on as well; but never in a game of life or death
for the weak state.
Unfortunately, the lack of external threat did not create domestic security for the
peoples of weak states. Rather to the contrary: it created a situation where state elites
could be self-seeking predators to the extent that domestic chaos and violent conflict
could go to any extreme without paying the ultimate price: termination of the state.
In most cases, post-independence leaders of weak states were not interested in
the creation of strong states; they feared that the latter would represent a potential
threat to their grip on state power. But in contrast to the colonial elites, the new
rulers were not insulated from society: they were closely connected to it via ties
of clan, kinship and ethnic affiliation. The network of clients had great expectations
of benefits from the power over the state apparatus. This opened the door to
clientelism, patronage, and nepotism.^53
Basing themselves on patron–client relationships, self-seeking state elites lacked
legitimacy from the beginning and faced populations divided along ethnic, religious
and social lines. They created ‘captured states’ that benefited the leading strongman
Structural realism and changes in statehood 117