5 Waltz, ‘Reflections’, p. 330; Waltz, Theory, pp. 92, 118.
6 Waltz, Theory, p. 121. For Waltz’s theory to work, he also needs to assume that states
can never be certain about the intentions of other states. See ‘Conversations in
International Relations – interview with John J. Mearsheimer (Part II)’, International
Relations, 20 (2), 2006, pp. 231, 240–41.
7 I cannot find any place in Waltz’s work where he explicitly argues that states should seek
to gain power at the expense of other states. I do think, however, that it is implicit in his
work that states should seek to improve their position in the balance of power, although
hemakes clear that they should not attempt to gain too much power. The best discussion
of his thinking about war is Waltz, ‘The origins of war in neorealist theory’, in Robert
I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (eds), The Origins and Prevention of Major Wars
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 39–52. Waltz sometimes argues that
wars are the result of uncertainty and miscalculation, which seems to imply that starting
wars is a mistake. ‘Origins of war’, p. 47; Waltz, Theory, p. 168.
8 Waltz, Theory, pp. 190–91.
9 Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 54.
10 Waltz, Theory, p. 126.
11 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Origins of war’, p. 49; Waltz, Theory, p. 127. Also see Waltz, Realism
and International Politics, p. 79.
12 Waltz, ‘Origins of war’, p. 40.
13 Waltz, Theory, p. 126.
14 Waltz, Theory, pp. 124, 128.
15 Waltz, Theory, p. 126. On balancing and bandwagoning more generally, see Theory,
pp. 124–28.
16 Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism’s status-quo bias: what security dilemma?’ Security
Studies, 5 (3), 1996, pp. 90–121. Although Schweller was the first person to describe
Waltz’s theory as having a ‘status-quo bias’, he does not argue it is due to balancing
behaviour, as I do. Instead, he argues that it is because Waltz focuses exclusively on
security-seeking states and ignores revisionist or greedy states. Also see Deborah
Boucoyannis, ‘The international wanderings of a liberal idea, or why liberals can learn
to stop worrying and love the balance of power’, Perspectives on Politics, 5 (4), 2007,
pp. 710–11, 719; Elman, ‘Horses for courses’; Keith L. Shimko, ‘Realism, neorealism,
and American liberalism’, Review of Politics, 54 (2), 1992, pp. 281–301.
17 I disagree with Waltz on this important point. I argue that the international system would
be competitive and dangerous even if all the states were rational agents. John J.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001). As discussed
below, Waltz’s world becomes competitive and dangerous once he takes away the
rational actor assumption and allows that great powers often act recklessly. Indeed, I
maintain that states become even more aggressive than he appears to recognize. I do not
explore our difference, however, because the focus here is on examining Waltz’s theory
on its own terms.
18 Recklessness is not simply misguided aggressiveness. A reckless state can also fail to take
the necessary steps to defend itself against a dangerous adversary.
19 Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. xii.
20 Comment made by Waltz at ‘The King of Thought’ conference.
21 Waltz told Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg in May 1993, ‘I’ve been a fierce critic of
American military policy and spending and strategy, at least since the 1970s.’ See
‘Interview with Ken Waltz’, Review of International Studies, 24 (3), 1998, p. 373. He
elaborates his criticisms throughout this interview. Also see Waltz, Realism and
International Politics, ch. 23.
22 Waltz, ‘Origins of war’, p. 44.
23 In Theory, Waltz emphasizes that socialization and competition are important processes
that tend to produce ‘sameness’ among states. ‘Competition’, he argues, ‘spurs the actors
to accommodate their ways to the socially most acceptable and successful practices.
138 Reckless states and realism