Socialization and competition are two aspects of a process by which the variety of
behaviours and of outcomes is reduced.’ Theory, pp. 74–77, 127–28. One might think
that socialization and competition lead states to become increasingly rational over time
in Waltz’s world. But he does not make that argument; there is no evidence from his
writings that he believes that states have learned to act more strategically over time. As
he remarked at the ‘King of Thought’ conference, ‘state learning is not impressive’. Of
course, in a world where reckless states are commonplace, socialization might very well
perpetuate the presence of reckless states, and undermine smart learning.
24 Waltz, Theory, p. 72. Also see pp. 67–73, 121–23.
25 Waltz, ‘Reflections’, p. 340.
26 Waltz, Theory, p. 65.
27 Waltz, Theory, pp. 65, 69, 71, 125.
28 Elman, ‘Horses for courses’, pp. 7–53. Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International politics
is not foreign policy’, and Colin Elman, ‘A response to Kenneth Waltz’, in Security Studies,
6 (1), 1996, pp. 54–61.
29 Elman, ‘Horses for courses’, pp. 33, 37, 40.
30 This subheading is based on Waltz’s comment that, ‘A theory is not a statement about
everything that is important in international-political life, but rather a necessarily slender
explanatory construct.’ Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. 76.
31 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the
World Wars(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire:
Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991);
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict(Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999). Neoclassical realists also combine realist and unit-level variables
in ways that are consistent with Waltz’s thinking. See Brian Rathbun, ‘A rose by any
other name: neoclassical realism as the logical and necessary extension of structural
realism’, Security Studies, 17 (2), 2008, pp. 294–321.
32 The fact that realists like Posen, Snyder, and Van Evera incorporate domestic political
factors into their theories leads Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravscik to question whether
they should be categorized as realists. ‘Is anybody still a realist?’ There is no question that
these scholars have developed compound theories, not straightforward realist theories,
and thus one can legitimately raise questions about whether they should be categorized
as realists. But this is simply a labelling issue, which is of little consequence.
33 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 18. Also see p. 60.
34 Nevertheless, Waltz does appear to make some policy predictions, as Colin Elman points
out in ‘Horses for courses’, pp. 10–11. Of course, Waltz’s theory allows for rational as
well as misguided states. He is not saying that all great powers behave foolishly all of the
time. Indeed, there have to be some savvy states if balancing coalitions are to form against
especially aggressive great powers. His theory should be able to predict how those rational
states will act, and he says as much when he writes: ‘The theory leads us to expect states
to behave in ways that result in balances forming.’ Theory, p. 125. Also see pp. 71–72,
128; Waltz, Realism and International Politics, p. 167. It is the behaviour of reckless states
that his theory cannot explain. And given how commonplace they are in his world, he
has little choice but to concentrate on explaining outcomes, while maintaining that ‘the
behaviour of states and of statesmen... is indeterminate’. Theory, p. 68.
35 Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory’, p. 331.
36 Waltz, ‘Reflections on Theory’, p. 329. Also see Waltz, Theory, p. 70.
37 Two other studies which emphasize the connection between behaviour and outcomes
in Waltz’s work are Elman, ‘Horses for courses’, and James D. Fearon, ‘Domestic politics,
foreign policy, and theories of international relations’, Annual Review of Political Science,
1, 1998, pp. 289–313.
38 Waltz, Realism and International Politics, pp. xii–xiii; Waltz, Theory, p. 170.
39 Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), develops this line of argument.
Reckless states and realism 139