international developments in general and the complex reality of the US dominance
in particular.
Second, I will focus on a comparable underlying logic in balance of power
thinking and rational choice thinking, arguing that in both there is an idea of a
natural tendency towards equilibrium; it is to be reached via rational strategies of
balancing on the one hand, and cooperation and conflict on the other. The
assumption of a tendency towards equilibrium underlies all structural realist premises,
and for realists this idea explained the character of international relations in the Cold
War. After the end of that period, however, the dynamics of international relations
changed. Under the condition of unipolarity – which lacks, in Waltz’s view, any
actual balancers^3 – the tendency towards equilibrium remains in fact latent. The
implications of this will be discussed below.
In the remaining part of the chapter, international terrorism is offered as an
illustration to examine the effects of hegemony in mind and matter with regard to
the Middle East. It argues that disequilibrium at the sub-state level results in adverse
effects on global stability.
Unipolarity, dominance and hegemony
Structural realism, as influenced by economics,^4 takes a predominantly materialist
perspective on all human affairs, including international relations. For Waltz, the
structure of the international system is defined by the distribution of power, and
especially the number and constellation of dominating powers. Domination is
based on the command of superior power resources (capabilities), such as ‘size of
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military
strength, political stability and competence’.^5 ‘Political stability’ and ‘competence’
are factors that are not obviously material; they remain relatively under-explained
by Waltz, and are often not used at all in structural realist explanations. All other
factors are distinctly material in nature and are obviously opposed to ideational
factors, such as ideology, propensity to peace, aggressiveness, and so forth. The
latter are even explicitly excluded as markers of power by Waltz.^6 The material
‘capabilities’ then are measured relationally to describe the distribution of power
within the system, and therefore to distinguish certain states (according to struc-
tural realism the only important actors within the international system) as ‘poles of
power’. In Waltz’s words: ‘The structure of the system changes with changes in the
distribution of capabilities across the system’s units.’^7 The international system’s
configuration, therefore, is referred to in terms of material polarity in order to
describe the centre(s) of domination and the number of dominating states.^8
Historically, Waltz argued, we have lived through different constellations of
polarity.^9 Inthe case of the current international system, however, we find an
obvious anomaly: the system is often referred to as being marked by ‘unipolarity’,^10
meaning there is only one dominant power (the United States) with no significant
challenger(s). Waltz, in his Theory of International Politics, did not initially think of
unipolarity as a theoretical puzzle or even as a possibility, but now argues (with
Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower 233