usually involving the use of other non-natural material elements (such as weapons
or the means of production) and resulting in material change (such as a shift in
polarity, the accumulation of wealth, and the destruction or creation of state entities
or institutions).^36 Even the most appealing idea cannot be realised without successful
agency; the latter, however, is itself dependent on material potential again, such as
weapons and energy resources held by states. Wars, revolutions, the creation of new
political entities, the political discourse via the media are all highly dependent on
material resources, and all are realised via agency. For example, violence depends
on financial and energy resources and weaponry, politically creative acts need an
economic backing and an infrastructure, and even political discourse is dependent
on media.
IR as a discipline struggles to reconcile the differences between realism, as a
materialist approach to world affairs, and constructivism, as focusing mainly on the
ideational. In concluding the first part of this chapter, it should now be apparent
that material and ideational factors are both necessary for understanding, among
other things, the predominant position of the United States in the world. It is not
the only great power, but it is the most dominant in both the ideational dimension
(its discourse and ideology) and in the material dimension (its economy, armament)
which together combine into hegemony.^37 US hegemony then rests on material
foundations, but was created and is maintained via the promotion of ideas.
Structural realism, rational choice and the search for
equilibrium
Unipolarity, which is traditionally represented by dominance in material terms, is
not the only possible configuration for the international system, nor has it ever
proven everlasting.^38 Waltz argues that unipolarity leads to counter-balancing and
therefore to the re-creation of ‘international politics proper’.^39 He assumes that we
have a historically observable, law-like tendency towards a ‘balance of power’, which
is reflected in his prognosis of a return to multi-polarity. Let us therefore assume
that structural realism proclaims material ‘equilibrium’ as the ideal situation; thereby
space is opened up for agency, as ‘the state’ fulfils the need for equilibrium through
its balancing behaviour. A balancing mechanism only makes sense under this
assumption: it is the attempt to correct an asymmetry in international affairs, and to
recreate the balance of power, with two equal poles as the preferred constellation.^40
Most assumptions of structural realism about states’ behaviour, and the stability of
the system, direct us towards this understanding. Note the following views of Waltz
himself: ‘bipolarity is most stable’; ‘in an asymmetric constellation, the weaker power
will balance against the stronger one’; and ‘symmetric powers will also balance
against each other, but not if they can coalesce (align with each other) or bandwagon
(align with a stronger one) against a dominating power’. The tendency towards
equilibrium here is not regarded as a normative postulate, but is assumed to be a
rational outcome (hence to be expected),^41 depending on the presumably univer-
sal strategy of competitive,^42 self-regarding, reciprocal behaviour, accumulating
236 Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower