resources in response to gains by the relevant other state. It also only applies over
the longue durée. If understood normatively, the tendency towards equilibrium would
even be all-inclusive, and not applying only to the major states.
A reciprocal logic, interestingly, also underlies institutionalist thinking, such as
the notion of ‘tit-for-tat’.^43 Tit-for-tat rose to prominence due in particular to its
use in rational-choice theory. According to Axelrod, it describes the most effective
strategy of interaction in many cooperation games, and proclaims a strict reciprocity:
cooperation is answered with cooperation, defection with defection. Here too,
therefore, we find a self-regarding, reciprocal mechanism directed towards equilib-
rium, even if not measured in material capabilities but in positive or negative action
towards the other. Both ‘strategies’, balancing and tit-for-tat, thus assume as the
expected action a reciprocal behaviour that recreates or maintains equilibrium. This
might take the form either of direct positive or negative action towards the other,
as in tit-for-tat, or by positive action internally and/or with others against the third
state, as in balancing.
A problem for rational-choice theory (tit-for-tat in particular) – and this will be
important for the discussion in the third part of this chapter – is that inequality
between the actors is usually not discussed: in most simulations there is an implicit
assumption of equality amongst them.^44 But if unequal actors are facing cooperation
games, the weaker actor cannot expect to affect the stronger actor much by rely-
ing on the logic of tit-for-tat; equilibrium might then not be achieved.^45 In an
asymmetric constellation, the more powerful actor does not have to fear defection
from the weaker actor as a response to its non-cooperation; it can bear the potential
costs without losing as much as it gains from non-cooperation, whereas the weaker
actor might just lack the capability to respond with appropriate negative action. The
hegemon can therefore depart from the logic of reciprocity and engage in more
exploitative behaviour. Thus, a marked asymmetry in international affairs represents
a strategic problem for the weaker states. The cooperation of the hegemon in such
a constellation cannot be ensured via reciprocal action towards it. Whether the
hegemon chooses to cooperate or defect, in the absence of equality or sufficiently
powerful balancers, is therefore at its own discretion.^46 We might, finally, have to
contemplate that while equilibrium here refers only to material factors, it might also
be present as a long-term tendency within the sphere of ideas.
Structural realism addresses the inequality problem – remaining within the
rationale of self-help – via the invention of coalition, or ‘bandwagoning’, among
the weaker states, who then together balance against the strong state. However, and
the end of the Cold War is an example of when material balancing is no longer
feasible, weaker powers can also try to change their interaction with others to make
it less competitive.
Hegemony and equilibrium
As long as the Cold War persisted – two great powers opposing each other in both
material and ideological terms, under the condition of rough equality between them
Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower 237