- reciprocity, tending towards negative, conflictual behaviour,^47 was at least partly
applied,^48 as well as balancing. The outcome maintained an approximate equilibrium
between the two superpowers. Realists would claim that neither was in need of
intensive cooperation with the other as both were self-sustaining (I do not count
détente or peaceful coexistence as intense forms of cooperation, rather as a de-
escalation of their confrontation). However, in the realist view, towards the end of
the Cold War the United States had outspent the Soviet Union, which could no
longer maintain its empire or its competitive behaviour due to its internal economic
difficulties and an overall decline in capability and power.^49 In the absence of other
strong alliance partners, it had to change towards more cooperative behaviour in
order to maintain its internal political stability (in which it nonetheless failed).^50
Constructivism would interpret this transformation as caused by a change of
the underlying logic of interaction into a social, other-regarding one.^51 Due to
an internal change in ideas, the weaker power started to accept asymmetry and
abstained from balancing. In response, the new hegemon (the United States) was
perceived to cease to base its international politics on calculating the costs and
benefits with regard to the former antagonist. By becoming partly cooperative, it
was thought to no longer use its power in a solely competitive way. Hegemony is
not directly addressed in Wendt’s work, but the interpretation above can be derived
from the larger sociological rationale. This interpretation concurs with the realist
invention of cooperation under asymmetry, hegemonic stability theory. This
assumes the role of the hegemon to be a collectively beneficial one in ensuring
international order via the installation of institutions, the implementation of norms
and the facilitation of cooperation.^52 The hegemon, thus, uses its power to inspire
the transformation of anarchy from a self-help system into a social system. Adler’s
constructivism, for example, theoretically solves the collective-action problem in
this way.^53 The hegemon’s material domination, under the condition of its other-
regarding behaviour,^54 is accepted by the other states as more profitable than
threatening.^55 The hegemon thus acquires ideational power: namely soft power and
legitimacy.^56 This is the basis for a transformation of Hobbesian anarchy under the
hegemon’s rule into a Lockean or Kantian one, with a reduction in self-help and
balancing.
The change from balance of power towards cooperation under asymmetry at
the end of the Cold War, transforming conflictual bipolarity into hegemonic unipo-
larity, was therefore inspired by ideas and material changes and resulted in new
ideational and material facts.^57 The emergence of the new globalhegemony in the
early 1990s (in opposition to the formerly geographically closely defined sphere of
influence of the United States) depended historically on ‘new thinking’ and the loss
of competitive capability in the Soviet Union, and on an increase in military
spending and the promotion of a ‘new world order’ by the new hegemon. This new
world order was supposed to replace traditional power politics after the end of the
Cold War, via the expansion of US liberalism with its claim to global validity. It
inspired global processes – globalisation, the promotion of human rights and a ‘third
wave’ of democracy – resulting in material and ideological changes. Furthermore,
238 Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower