Also, in many states anti-Americanism was on the rise. If we now assume that the
tendency towards equilibrium in ideational and material terms is still present as a
latent underlying dynamic, we can expect opposing ideologies to emerge, together
with a recurrence of material balancing.
Equilibrium and integration as mutually dependent
With a possible coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps others, against the United
States, a future system would have to tackle the issue of how to prevent a ‘de-
evolutionary’ turn in international relations towards traditional power politics, and
how to integrate two possible antagonists – an Eastern and a Western alliance, if we
extrapolate – under the institutions of global governance. Global governance, the
cooperation of states and other actors in, under and in compliance with common
institutions, is a Western, US-led creation. It was created mainly in the Cold War
period and its aftermath, and is therefore historically still in its infancy. It is ques-
tionable how far these institutions, and the thickness of accompanying interaction
processes described by the term ‘interdependence’, can solve the possibly re-
emergent problem of competition, in the long term, between two or more great
powers. Some would argue that similar processes in the interwar period failed to
prevent the Second World War.^66 The outcome will depend on the strength of the
existing institutions and the development of ideas (materialised via agency)^67 by both
the emerging challengers and the challenged combined. The latter will decide if we
manage to remain in an international Lockean or Kantian anarchy, marked by
friendly international relations, by compliance with international norms and by
cooperation. A new emerging bi- or multi-polarity would not necessarily have to
fall back into structural realism’s pure logic and, with regard to the still-existing
nuclear threat, surely must not. This can be prevented by the hegemon’s compliance
with its benign role as a guarantor of integration and cooperation under common
institutions, and by its support for the effective realisationof increasing global
equilibrium. If indeed the tendency towards equilibrium is satisfied, I argue that
balancing as an oppositional behaviour does not necessarily need to occur, even
under asymmetric conditions. Also, international interactions under bi- or multi-
polarity do not have to escalate into major competition if there is a common
ideology or idea. Such an idea could reflect a belief in further integration in global
governance on an equal and democratic basis, with strong institutions binding the
two or more poles together. If, however, the hegemon violates the promises and
ideas on which its benign hegemony rests, this will indeed result, as Waltz forecasts,^68
in an ‘accumulation of crises’ and in the threatened erosion of integration, of
socialisation, and of the maturation of anarchy. The most capable states might then
refer to traditional strategies of balancing, with a possibility of conflict, should a
transition of power take place and a potential new hegemon emerge.^69 It is argued
that global cooperation under common institutions is the most powerful idea for
international peace,^70 and it seems to this author that Waltz also came close to
arguing this in Man, the State and War.^71
240 Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower