An illustration of the synthetic approach: terrorism in the
Middle East
Finally, it is important to extend the theory of ‘tendency towards equilibrium’, and
the mutuality of both ideas and material facts, to the sub-state level. This helps us
to understand the dynamics underlying international terrorism, currently a very
prominent security threat particularly in relation to the hegemon. Terrorism reflects
major opposition to the latest ‘new world order’ proclaimed by the United States
(even if exercised by a minority) and is hence potentially a first sign of grander
processes within international relations. Let us for this purpose turn now to Waltz’s
first proposition made in his essay entitled, significantly, ‘Continuity in International
Politics’.^72 Waltz writes: ‘Terrorism does not change the imbalance of world power’
(at least in the short term) and it might even aggravate this fact (or at least the
application of power in international affairs). Both elements of the proposition could
be observed empirically in the aftermath of 9/11. However, international terrorist
attacks are very much a symptomof, rather than a peripheral occurrence within,
hegemony; they are a result of the imbalance of world power, and possibly indicate
important tendencies, which might lead to future change.
We must remember here that, according to Waltz, balancing takes place in a
rather unequal relationship of power, whereas bandwagoning is frequent in more
equal relationships of power.^73 The power relationship between the states of the
Middle East (the main breeding ground of international terrorism)^74 and the United
States (in the past its main target)^75 is highly unequal, so balancing should classically
be expected. Overall, the Middle East finds itself in a starkly weaker position than
the United States and the ‘West’ in general, in both military and economic terms,
with declining relative values for GDP growth and per capita GDP.^76 The Middle
East can be counted as a semi-peripheral region of the world, with half its states
belonging to the developed and half to the developing world.^77
According to structural realism, all of these factors should lead us to assume that
the states of the Middle East would try to balance the United States. Any attempt
to balance the United States could assume the form of regional integration in the
Middle East, and would probably involve seeking alignment specifically with China,
but also with Russia. However, with the exception of Iran and Syria, there is as yet
little sign of such balancing among Middle Eastern states; they seem rather to prefer
alignment with the United States,^78 to which opposition remains at a somewhat
tentative level. In line with the argument in the preceding section, this absence of
balancing can be explained by looking at the extent of socialisation of the elites in
Middle Eastern states, and therefore the extension of ideas and hegemony in this
area at the unit level. This process has been described by Galtung as the empire’s
strategy of creating ‘client elites’ among the bridgehead states in the periphery,
connecting these states with the ‘core elites’, and making them serve as transmitters
of ‘coercion’ or power over the populations not under the hegemon’s direct
influence.^79 Balancing by states in the Middle East is therefore prevented by the
immersion of their elites in the ideological hegemony of the United States. The
Global War on Terrorism is a critical instance of this ideological hegemonic
Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower 241