theory, tit-for-tat assumes non-cooperation or defection rather than violence, this
argument can be derived by taking its logic further and apply it to material conflict.
It can be argued that the experience of violence exercised by the West against the
Middle East is a reason for terrorist organisations in this region to engage in counter-
violence.^86 Furthermore, US-led globalisation can be seen as the spread of an
ideological or cultural influence that not all Middle Eastern populations exposed to
it will approve of, and this can support the counter-action referred to above.
Therefore, we can assume that terrorists are attempting to work towards equilib-
rium, in terms of material, political and ideational improvements for the populations
of the Middle East and between the states of the Middle East, on the one hand, and
the United States and the West, on the other. For that purpose, other actors would
- according to the theory of structural realism – choose to balance. This being
impossible for terrorists as sub-state organisations, with no means of establishing a
military force or a strong economic system, or of developing any other nationally
or even regionally significant capabilities, they are restricted to finding a response in
different kinds of action. Their most effective weapon (that of ‘the weak’),^87
especially if they are not capable of forming mass movements, is violence expressed
as terrorism. Terrorism can be a very effective type of action, as low-cost measures
result in politically very important effects (general shock among the target population
which in turn exerts pressure on a particular government). Terrorists therefore use
violence in order at least to signal their dismay at and rejection of US power, and
to exert pressure on target governments to change their policies. They apply vio-
lence here in a tit-for-tat fashion in order to mimic balancing and to counter material
or structural violence from the West. Significantly, Ivan Eland has argued that
terrorist attacks mostly occur in direct response to Western (or US) interventions.^88
In conclusion, in the absence of state-led balancing (where it might have been
expected), sub-state actors seek to apply violence in a tit-for-tat fashion in order to
signal opposition to the power with which their state remains out of balance. As
‘true’ balancing per definitionemdoes only take place between at least formally ‘equal’
actors (that is, states), terrorism is a substitute in those cases where balancing for
certain political reasons might be expected but remains absent. Material and
ideological factors interact in relations between the United States and the states of
the Middle East and in some of them transform potential balancing behaviour at the
unit or even regional level into sub-state violence. Ideological power, exerted by
the United States to create its sphere of influence, constrains the elites in the Middle
East and – up to the present – has hindered balancing behaviour. This constraining
factor is absent at the sub-state level, which is subject to a higher exposure to the
negative effects of this hegemony. Therefore a counter-ideology is formed, and on
this basis material opposition is exercised. However, material constraints at the sub-
state level at the same time limit the action radius of the terrorists, and condemn
them to individual, isolated attacks in a tit-for-tat fashion.
Terrorism, therefore, does not change the balance between the major powers in
international affairs, and here I agree with Waltz. However, terrorism is a sign of
weakness in a supposedly hegemonic situation. Terrorism against the West can
Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower 243