therefore indicate an erosion of hegemony if the hegemon is not capable of extend-
ing its ideological umbrella. In the long term, if hegemony in terms of soft power
and legitimacy is not strengthened, sub-state opposition might spill over to the unit
or even global level. Indeed some Middle Eastern states, since the advent of the
Global War on Terrorism, have directed their foreign policies increasingly towards
the East, for instance by cooperating with China in the oil economy.^89
Conclusion
There exist at least two possible scenarios for the future of international relations.
First, there is the prospect of growing opposition to the United States at the global,
international and sub-state levels because of increasing frustration with the malign
effects of the new world-order. Second, there is the possibility that the United States
might re-occupy the role of a benign hegemon, and integrate the world increasingly
into what can be termed a global ‘transnational state’, hence an effective and
hopefully democratic global governance. The decisive element here will be if the
tendency towards equilibrium can be satisfied, and therefore possibilities for global
governance on a more egalitarian basis be provided.
In both cases, the material and ideational dimensions are important in explaining
the continuities in the current international system, as well as indicating its possible
demise. For an improved anticipation of future international relations, we should
not forget structural realism’s claims, but they must be combined with constructivist
interpretations.
Furthermore, an important contribution of structural realism is to be found in
promoting the idea of a ‘tendency towards power equilibrium’, which can serve as
a force for stability. This very simple but profound idea, it has been argued, can be
used in explaining international interactions even in the absence of traditional
balancing; and it can, for example, be applied for describing the causes of possible
new conflicts, such as resulting from an emergent Asia as a new challenger or from
international terrorism as violence directed against the West.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Ken Booth, James Connelly, Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Justin
Rosenberg, Alexander Wendt, Tom Kane, Andrew Liaropoulus, Kamran Matin and
Colin Tyler, participants in the security-studies seminar at the University of Hull and in
the Waltz Conference at Aberystwyth University, for very helpful comments on this
chapter. Particular thanks to Kenneth Waltz for his cooperation in the interviews, and
my parents, Hannelore and Wolfgang Beyer, as well as Peter Barnes, for their support
and patience in the final stages of writing.
2 Compare Gunther Hellman (ed.), ‘The forum: are dialogue and synthesis possible in
International Relations?’, International Studies Review, 29 (5), 2003, pp. 123–53.
3 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘America as a model for the world? A foreign policy perspective’,
Political Science and Politics,24 (4), 1991, pp. 667–70, p. 669.
4 Structural realism was particularly influenced by microeconomics; Kenneth Waltz in
interview with the author, 2007.
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 131.244 Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower