(30) 1, 2005, pp. 46–75 detected and explained only ‘soft’ balancing of the European
Union.
24 Compare also Jonathan Joseph, ‘Hegemony and the structure-agent problem in
International Relations: a scientific realist contribution’, Review of International Studies, 34
(1), 2008, pp. 109–28.
25 David Harvey, The New Imperialism(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
26 This term is not generally used by constructivists, but – by referring to power via
ideological attraction – also shows that there is a possible link between scholars influenced
by realist thought and constructivism.
27 Compare for example Qinxing Ken Wang, ‘Hegemony and socialization of the mass
public: the case of postwar Japan’s cooperation with the United States on China policy’,
Review of International Studies, 29/2003, pp. 99–119, William Robinson, Promoting
Polyarchy: Globalisation, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
28 Compare, for a similar approach, Samuel Barkin, ‘Realist Constructivism’, Review of
International Studies,29 (5), 2003, pp. 325–42.
29 Robert Keohane, ‘Ideas part-way down’, Review of International Studies, (26) 1, 2000,
pp. 125–30.
30 Daniel Chirot, How Societies Change(Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 2000).
31 Chirot, How Societies Change, p. 11.
32 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power
politics’, International Organization, (46) 2, 1992, pp. 391–425, p. 412.
33 Craig Parsons, A Certain Idea of Europe(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).
34 Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations
(Princeton, CA: Princeton University Press, 2001); Johan Galtung, Peace and Social
Structure. Essays in Peace Research, Vol. III (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1978), p. 298.
35 Wendt and Waltz in interviews with the author, 2007 and 2008.
36 See here the agent-structure debate, for example David Dessler, ‘What’sat stake in the
agent-structure debate?’, International Organization,43 (3), 1989, pp. 441–73.
37 Cornelia Beyer, Violent Globalisms: Conflict in Response to Empire(London: Ashgate, 2008),
chs 2 and 3; Beyer, Counterterrorism and International Power Relations.
38 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power: The US in a Chaotic World(New
York: AK Press, 2003).
39 Waltz in interview with the author, 2007.
40 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 163–70.
41 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 132. Waltz here describes the above-mentioned
argument, but seems to come to a slightly different conclusion, as otherwise his
aforementioned assumptions would be contradicted. Equilibrium, for him, is what states
strive for, but it is factually realised only among the great powers.
42 Defensive, in opposition to offensive, realism is proclaiming power parity as the aim of
competition.
43 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) and Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation(New York: Basic Books, 1984).
44 Sarah Joseph, ‘Power and rational choice’, in Sarah Joseph, Political Theory and Power
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 16–30.
45 Sonja Vogt and Jeroen Veesie, ‘Social support among heterogeneous partners’, Journal of
Economic Interaction and Coordination, 1/2006, pp. 215–32.
46 Beyer, Counterterrorism and International Power Relations, ch. 7.
47 Compare, for example, the Cuban missile crisis.
48 Robert Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International Relations’, International Organization, 40
(1), 1986, pp. 1–27.
49 William Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the end of the Cold War’, International Security, 19 (2),
1994/5, pp. 91–129.
246 Hegemony, equilibrium and counterpower