survive, and an unequal distribution of power among the state units. See Booth and
Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp. 35–36.
63 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War’,
International Security, 15 (4), 1990, pp. 5–56. See also Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics, p. 394.
64 Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 161.
65 I am indebted to Simon Davies who first compared these cases in his PhD. See his
‘Community versus deterrence’. See also Simon Davies and Nicholas J. Wheeler,
‘Nuclear proliferation and security after the Cold War’ in J. Davies (ed.), Security After
the Cold War(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), pp. 36–159.
66 Carasales, ‘The evolution of the Argentine–Brazilian nuclear rapprochement’.
67 Gideon Frank, ‘Concluding Remarks’ to the seminar on ‘Argentina and Brazil: The Latin
American Nuclear Rapprochement’.
68 Davies, ‘Community versus deterrence’, p. 68.
69 Carasales, ‘The evolution of the Argentine–Brazilian nuclear rapprochement’.
70 Booth and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp. 30–34, 39–40.
71 The concept of a ‘margin of safety’ is discussed in Booth and Wheeler, The Security
Dilemma, pp. 91, 241.
72 The ‘leap of trust’ idea is developed in Möllering, Trust, pp. 105–121. See also Booth
and Wheeler, The Security Dilemma, pp. 234–37. Möllering calls it the ‘leap of faith’.
Beyond Waltz’s nuclear world 267