Anarchic and hegemonic behaviour
Primacy poses a challenge to international society, whereas hegemony need not.
The task, therefore, is to ensure that the state enjoying primacy behaves in a
hegemonic way, in conformity with expectations created by the institution of
hegemony. This is quite contrary to the prescriptions of most neorealists. For them,
concentration of power isthe problem, and can be addressed only by its reduction.
Surprisingly, even those who hold wholly opposing views on the likely durability
of US primacy nonetheless agree on this conclusion. Those who see primacy as
unstable, and likely to be short-lived, insist that the problem is not a behavioural
one. ‘The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic
power. To reduce the fear of US power, the United States must accept some
reduction in its relative hard power.. .’^71 Those, on the other hand, most optimistic
about the durability of US primacy tend nonetheless to concur, suggesting that there
will be unease ‘no matter what Washington does’: ‘Nothing the United States could
do short of abdicating its power would solve the problem completely’.^72 Primacy,
as well as its resulting discontents, is evidently a function of capabilities, not of
diplomatic behaviour. ‘Prophylactic multilateralism’, we are therefore warned,
‘cannot inoculate the United States from counter-hegemonic balancing’.^73 This
again, however, brings out the conflation between primacy and the quite different
social relationship of hegemony. In Walt’s terms, the hegemon’s problem is not
simply what it ‘has’, but what others think it will ‘do’.^74 Hegemony offers a dis-
tinctive strategy for addressing the problems engendered by primacy, going beyond
any solution that relies simply upon the US divesting itself of some of its material
capabilities, or in which other states manage to balance successfully against it.
What would represent hegemonic behaviour, and how does this differ from
standard ‘anarchic’ accounts? There remains an interesting ambiguity, even within
those arguments that do concede hegemony is rooted in legitimacy. This ambiguity
is puzzling, because it seems to be predicated upon a notion of legitimacy derived
solely from self-interest. The puzzle is that legitimacy is normally understood to
constitute a ground for compliance different, in principle, from self-interest.^75 And
yet when it comes to discussions of hegemony, the most commonly identified source
of legitimacy is said to be this satisfaction of self-interest. This is demonstrably so in
HST, where the other actors benefit from the public goods and stability provided
by the hegemon. The hegemon delivers ‘a sufficient flow of benefits to small and
middle powers to persuade them to acquiesce’.^76 According to HST, ‘other states
will cooperate with a benign hegemon because they benefit strategically and eco-
nomically’.^77
This is equally so in some Gramscian accounts, although here the issue is more
complex, and there is considerable diversity of interpretation.^78 At one end are those
who introduce an element of false consciousness: hegemonic legitimacy is a
construct of the powerful, and the ruled are seduced into the belief that their interests
are thereby served. As Lukes had pointed out, ‘the most effective and insidious use
of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place’.^79 The problem
of what gives rise to the hegemon’s legitimacy remains. The implied answers scarcely
280 How hierarchical can international society be?