rules of the international system’.^94 Instead, it argues that the most appropriate
theoretical departure point is that already provided by the English School, precisely
because of its potential to view hegemony as a social institution. Within such a
conception, the advantages of hierarchy need to be reconciled with the demands of
anarchy, in the exceptional conditions of primacy.
Historically, tolerable degrees of consensus have most readily been attained in
conditions of relative equilibrium. The challenge, in a situation of primacy, is to
reconcile the particular needs and interests of the leading power with those of
international society at large. If, as English School theorists believe, the great powers
traditionally have been allowed to enjoy special rights and responsibilities within
international society, what follows likewise is the need to negotiate special rights
and responsibilities for the hegemon as well. The central puzzle is how to develop
this analogous role of great-power management, given the simultaneous absence of
equilibrium, and in a setting correspondingly more redolent of the unacceptable face
of hierarchy.
This involves dealing with two interconnected conceptual, and political, prob-
lems. First, since international society has always manifested some tendency to resist
the emergence of a ‘hegemon’, how is this concern best allayed in present condi-
tions? This can come only from the social expectations generated by the institution
of hegemony, and the manner in which the hegemon’s behaviour manages to satisfy
them. Secondly, while international society has shown past willingness to accept the
special role of a group of great powers, how is it to be persuaded to accord this role
to a single great power? The answer, in this case, must presumably include a shared
acceptance of the need to work from the distribution of power we have, rather than
from one we might otherwise prefer. An English School appreciation of hegemony
as an institution of international society allows for the possibility of hierarchy in
anarchy, responding to a social logic, unaccountable in terms of anarchy alone. This
resolves the problem in theory. To resolve it in practice remains a supreme political
challenge.
IR theory today confronts its own challenges. Central to these is its continuing
engagement with the understanding of power. This chapter has sought, through the
opposition between primacy and hegemony, to focus attention on two different
accounts of power. It is common enough to map the materiality of power, and its
seeming distributions. On the other hand, the compelling case can be made that
effective power must always be harnessed, in Ruggie’s telling phrase, to ‘legitimate
social purpose’.^95 Control over outcomes is always likely to be more complete in
the context of the latter than in the former alone. This chapter has explored the
connection between the two. It needs to be recognized, however, that this entails
some sleight of hand. The reason is that when we talk about a distributionof power,
we invariably mean by it measures of power in that material sense. The much harder
challenge for IR theory is to make sense of a concept of the distribution of power
that includes the complexities of that social purpose. States, to be sure, inhabit
‘structures’ of power, but these are never reducible to the simple material distri-
butions that many analysts associate with Waltz’s world.
How hierarchical can international society be? 283