International Organization, 53 (2), 1999, pp. 379–408; Hurd, After Anarchy; Clark,
Legitimacy, pp. 15–17.
52 H. Kissinger, A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Era(London:
Gollancz, 1977), p. 1.
53 Kissinger, World Restored, p. 5.
54 Kissinger, World Restored, p. 1.
55 K.J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991); A. Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London:
Routledge, 1992); A. Osiander, The States System of Europe 1640–1990: Peacemaking
and the Condition of International Stability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994);
P. W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
56 See, generally, D.A. Lake, ‘Leadership, hegemony, and the international economy: naked
emperor or tattered monarch with potential?’, International Studies Quarterly, 37 (4), 1993,
pp. 459–89; D. Snidal, ‘The limits of hegemonic stability theory’, International
Organization, 39 (4), 1985, pp. 579–614.
57 C.P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929–1939, revised edition, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986), p. 289.
58 Especially, R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981).
59 Keohane, International Institutions, p. 75.
60 Keohane, International Institutions, p. 78.
61 B. Buzan, The United States, p. 62.
62 R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations(Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1987), p. 73.
63 J. Joseph, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis(London: Routledge, 2002), p. 1.
64 Keohane, After Hegemony,p. 39.
65 M. Mastanduno, ‘Incomplete hegemony and security order in the Asia-Pacific’, in
G. John Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power(Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 181–83.
66 Adam Watson, Hegemony and History(London: Routledge, 2007); Simpson, Great Powers.
67 Hurd, After Anarchy, pp. 78–79. This raises the complex issues of ‘real’ interests, and of
varieties of ‘false consciousness’. This is Lukes’ third dimension of power: ‘the very idea
of power’s third dimension requires an external standpoint. Power as domination ...
involves the idea of constraints upon interests, and to speak of the third dimension of
such power is to speak of interests imputed to and unrecognized by the actors’. S. Lukes,
Power: A Radical View, Second edition, (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 145.
68 M. Haugaard, ‘Conceptual confrontation’, in Haugaard and Lentner, Hegemony and
Power, p. 4.
69 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 206.
70 Bull, Anarchical Society, p. 207.
71 Layne, ‘Unipolar illusion’, p. 40.
72 S.G. Brooks and W.C. Wohlforth, ‘American primacy in perspective’, Foreign Affairs, 81
(4), 2002, pp. 28–29.
73 Layne, ‘Unipolar illusion’, p. 24.
74 S.W. Walt, ‘Keeping the world “off–balance”: self-restraint and U.S. foreign policy’, in
Ikenberry (ed.), America Unrivaled, p. 136.
75 Hurd, ‘Legitimacy and authority’.
76 Keohane, International Institutions, p. 78.
77 Layne, ‘Unipolar illusion’, p. 17.
78 W.L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and
Cultural Theory(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); P. Burnham, ‘Neo-
Gramscian hegemony and the international order’, Capital and Class (1991); R.W. Cox,
Approaches to World Order(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); B. Fontana,
Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli(Minneapolis:
286 How hierarchical can international society be?