However, our figure is in line with Watson’s view of hegemony representing the norm
position in international relations.
28 See the discussion in the second section of Logic of Anarchy
29 David C. Kang, ‘Status hierarchy and war in early modern East Asia’. Unpublished article.
30 Taken from Buzan and Little ‘Reconceptualizing anarchy’, p. 430
31 Stefano Guzzini, ‘The concept of power: a constructivist analysis’, Millennium33 (3),
2005, pp. 495–521.
32 Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
33 James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society(Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press,1990); Barry Buzan, From International to World Society? English School Theory and the
Social Structure of Globalisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004);
K.J. Holsti,Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
34 See the debate between Waltz and Elman on this point. Colin Elman, ‘Horses for courses:
why not neorealist theories of foreign policy?’, Security Studies6 (1), 1996, pp. 7–53, and
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘International politics is not foreign policy’, Security Studies6 (1),
1996, pp. 54–57.
35 It follows that Schroeder’s historical evidence, suggesting that in multipolar Europe most
states most of the time failed to pursue a balancing strategy, fails to recognize Waltz’s
systemic perspective but is not, in any event, necessarily incompatible with Waltz’s
argument about the inherent instability of multipolar systems. See Paul W. Schroeder,
‘Historical reality versus neorealist theory’, International Security19, 1994, pp. 108–48.
36 For a fuller discussion, see Little, Balance of Power, ch. 6.
37 Goddard and Nexon, ‘Paradigm lost?’
38 For a comprehensive discussion of the balance of power from a world historical
perspective, see Stuart J. Kaufman, Richard Little and William C. Wohlforth, eds, The
Balance of Power in World History(London: Palgrave, 2007). What the analysis and case
studies in this book demonstrate is that from a world historical perspective, hegemony
and unipolarity occur just as frequently across time and space as bipolarity and
multipolarity.
39 Wohlforth, ‘The stability of a unipolar world’.
40 See, for example, the discussion of these agreements in Clark, Legitimacy in International
Society; Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power, (New York: WW
Norton, 1967) and Andreas Osiander, The States System of Europe, 1640–1990:
Peacemaking and Conditions of International Stability, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994).
41 See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Third edition,
(London: Macmillan, 2003) and Herbert Butterfield, The balance of power’, in
H. Butterfield and M. Wight, eds, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of
International Politics, (London: Allen & Unwin 1966). See also Richard Little, ‘The balance
of power and great power management’ in Richard Little and John Williams, eds, The
Anarchical Society in a Globalized World, (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2006).
42 See Teschke, The Myth of 1648, pp. 233–36. It is important to note that Teschke is
drawing on an essentially Marxist framework and he attributes the expansionist aims of
these dynastic states to domestic rather than international factors.
43 See Paul J. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics: 1763–1848, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 67.
44 Martin Wight, ‘Why is there no international theory?’ in Herbert Butterfield and Martin
Wight, eds, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics(London:
Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 26.
45 Andrew Linklater, ‘The achievements of critical theory’ in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and
Marysia Zalewski, eds, International Theory: Positivism and Beyond(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), p. 282; and Osiander, Before he State, p. 11.
46 Teschke, Myth of 1648, pp. 4 and 15.
47 This discussion is drawn from: Buzan and Albert, ‘Differentiation’.
304 The paradox of parsimony