structural theory that did not, in effect, ignore domestic politics, but constructed
a framework in which ‘a relatively comfortable domestic liberalism could coexist
with an international realism’. In these two interpretations, Waltz’s normative drive
was related to helping democracy and liberalism in the United States. For John
Mearsheimer, what came to be called Waltz’s ‘defensive realism’ embodies a
normative drive against war. In his chapter he declared that he found no evidence
of Waltz ‘endorsing the initiation of any past war’, and concluded that Waltz (like
Adam Smith) ‘opted’ to develop a normative theory; that is, a theory ‘not designed
to explain how the world worked in his day, but instead was prescribing a smarter
way for states to do business with each other, and ultimately make a better world’.
The discussion of Waltz’s argument that more nuclear weapons ‘may be better’ (see
the chapters by Daniel Deudney and Nicholas Wheeler) can be understood as
extensions of that point. Embracing military technology that promotes confidence
in war being ‘impossible’ between states that possess it appears to be more important
for Waltz than the purity of his long-held view about the warlike permissiveness of
anarchy.
When we think of Darwin’s work, we think of a life of intense observation and
the theory of evolution. The emancipation of slaves, enchantment, and love of the
world’s differences have not traditionally been at the forefront of our thoughts.
Likewise, when we think of Waltz’s work, we think of social science rigour and
the theory of structural realism; again, the saving of liberalism, honouring democ-
racy, and the elimination of war have not traditionally been at the forefront of
our thoughts. In each case, behind the mask of scientific intentions, as critical theory
has long claimed, we are always likely to find theorists activated (even if they do
not appreciate it themselves) by normative motivations. In Chapter 1 it was sug-
gested that leading figures in IR classical realism (notably Carr, Morgenthau, and
Herz), sought to escape from the dogmas of realism in the age of total war and
totalitarianism by exploring ‘utopian realist’ reforms. In comparison, Waltz has been
more consistent in his realism, by not looking beyond its tool-box; he has con-
centrated on the modalities of the balance of power, the idea of order based on
fear.
This picture of a normative Waltz suggests a radically different understanding of
his work than has been projected by both his social science supporters and various
critics. Particularly prominent among the latter was Richard Ashley, with his attack
on the ‘poverty of neorealism’:^20
What emerges is a positivist structuralism that treats the given order as the
natural order, limits rather than expands political discourse, negates or
trivializes the significance of variety across time and place, subordinates all
practice to an interest in control, bows to the ideal of a social power beyond
responsibility, and thereby deprives political interaction of those practical
capacities which make social learning and creative change possible. What
emerges is an ideology that anticipates, legitimizes, and orients a totalitarian
project of global proportions: the rationalization of global politics.The inconvenient truth 331