of Waltz’s theory, balance of power becomes explanatory in a deeper sense than it
usually is – not unlike the status of models in the ‘mediating’ school presented above.
It is important to notice how abstract the theory is, and consequently how
contingent and mediated the situational expectations are.
Compare Mearsheimer who presents his theory in terms of ‘assumptions’. First,
the international system is anarchic; second, great powers inherently possess some
offensive military capability; third, states can never be certain about other states’
intentions; fourth, survival is the primary goal of great powers; fifth, great powers
are rational actors.^62
Waltz, in contrast, insists that his
definition of structure includes only what is required to show how the units
of the system are positioned or arranged. Everything else is omitted.^63These are different structures of theory. Waltz states oneassumption (and defends the
principles behind simplifying assumptions) – that states seek to ensure their survival.^64
This, however, is not an additional assumption, exterior to the basic picture – it is a
necessary assumption in order for the structure to be possible, an element in the
concept of anarchy. ‘A theory contains at least one theoretical assumption.’^65
‘Balance-of-power politics prevails wherever two, and only two, requirements are
met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.’^66
Fundamentally different is to list assumptions that are not part of one integrated
conception, but separately meant to be ‘reasonably accurate’. This leads to a
computational logic of factors that interact. This approaches the if–then format of
propositions dominant in IR. The pictorial approach, in contrast, organises around
onecore idea.^67
Discussions of Waltz’s theory have continuously been conducted as ifthe theory
was of the propositional form. It is almost as if everybody was ashamed to admit
they could not find the ‘theory’ (in the sense they expected it to exist), and therefore
just discussed it as if we all knew. Or, more likely, we are so used in political science
to sloppy ‘theories’, that we could discuss a theory at this great length without
specifying what the theory was. Thus it was overlooked that, in this case, the theory
wasthere – only in a different shape than expected.
This has at least a specific and a general implication. The specific one has to do
with neorealism, its validity and limitations. The general one is about the criteria
for theories: Allegedly, Waltz/TIPhas been the measure of ‘theory’ for thirty years.
How the ‘highest’ theory is understood shapes the judgment of other contributions
to the field. Part 3 reveals this dimension by placing TIPwithin the history of the
discipline. Section 2.4 underlines the impact of my re-reading by showing how
today’s neorealists mishandle their Waltzian heritage. But first, the present section
should be rounded off by three critical observations on Waltz’s presentation of his
theory.
(1) TIPcontains strikingly few diagrams.^68 If the theory is basically a picture of
an arrangement, one should expect to see it – depicted. It should be possible to read
76 Waltz’s theory of theory