78 CHAPTER 3|FEDERALISM
Congress could have demonstrated the point by showing that (1) most guns are
made in one state and sold in another (thus commercially crossing state lines),
(2) crime aff ects the economy and commerce, and (3) the quality of education,
which is also crucial to the economy, is harmed if students and teachers are wor-
rying about guns in their schools. However, members of Congress did not present
this evidence because they did not think it was necessary.
Alfonso Lopez, a high school senior, was arrested for carrying a concealed
handgun with fi ve bullets in it. Lopez moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that
the law was unconstitutional because carrying a gun in a school could not be reg-
ulated as “interstate commerce.” The Court agreed in United States v. Lopez.^33
If Congress wanted to encroach on the states’ turf in the future, the Court indi-
cated, Congress would have to demonstrate that the law in question was a legiti-
mate exercise of the commerce clause powers.
As a result, the next time Congress passed legislation that aff ected law enforce-
ment at the state level, it documented the impact on interstate commerce. The
Violence Against Women Act was passed in 1994 after weeks of testimony and
evidence showing the links between violence against women and commerce.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that Congress did not have
the power under the commerce clause to make a national law that gave victims
of gender-motivated violence the right to sue their attackers in federal court.
(However, the Court only struck down that part of the law; the program funding
remained unaff ected.)^34
The significance of such rulings is enormous. Not only has the Court set new
limits on Congress’s ability to address national problems (the “congruence and
proportionality” test), but it has also clearly stated that the Court alone will
determine which rights warrant protection by Congress. However, the Court
does not consistently rule against Congress; it often rules against the states
because of broader constitutional principles or general public consensus behind
a specific issue. For example, the Court struck down Arkansas’s three-term
limit for members of Congress, ruling that states could not impose any addi-
tional limits on the qualifications for being a member of Congress beyond those
in the Constitution.^35 The Court has also struck down state laws limiting gay
rights as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment^36 and has upheld Congress’s power to regulate marijuana over states that
had attempted to allow its medical use,^37 and while the Court
rejected the commerce clause as the constitutional justifica-
tion for national health care reform, it did uphold the ACA
based on Congress’s taxing power.^38
Based on these and other cases, some would argue that
the shift in power toward the states has been relatively mar-
ginal. Furthermore, the national government still has the
upper hand in the balance of power and can readily blunt the
impact of a Court decision: First, Congress can pass new laws
to clarify its legislative intent and can overturn any cases
that involve statutory interpretation. Second, Congress can
use its fi nancial power to impose its will on the states. So,
for example, Congress could pass a law stating that before
a state could receive money from the federal government
related to the relevant law, it would have to agree to abide by
the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act. Thus while the Supreme Court has
THE LOPEZ DECISION STRUCK DOWN
the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones
Act, ruling that Congress did not
have the power to forbid people to
carry guns near schools. After the
shooting of 12 students and one
teacher at Columbine High School
in Jefferson County, Colorado, on
April 20, 1999, there were renewed
calls nationwide for strengthening
gun control laws.