248 CHAPTER 8|INTEREST GROUPS
AMOUNT OF PUBLIC ATTENTION
Interest groups are more likely to succeed when their request attracts little public
attention.^40 When the average voter does not know or care about a group’s request,
legislators and bureaucrats do not have to worry about the political consequences
of giving the group what it wants. The only question is whether the offi cials them-
selves favor the request or can be convinced that the group’s desired change is
worthwhile. In contrast, when the issue attracts a lot of public attention, a legisla-
tor’s response to lobbying will hinge on her judgment of constituent opinion: Do
voters favor what the group wants? After all, the average legislator has a strong
interest in re-election and is unlikely to act against her constituents’ wishes. As a
result, lobbying may count for nothing in the face of public opposition or be super-
fl uous when the group’s position already has public support.^41
The idea of interest group lobbying probably brings to mind titanic struggles
on controversial issues (such as gun control, abortion rights, or judicial nomina-
tions) over which groups try to capture public attention as a way of pressuring
the government. But not all interest group lobbying is so high profi le. Consider the
National Turkey Federation, an association of turkey farmers and processors.
The Federation sponsors the annual ritual of presenting the president with a live
Thanksgiving turkey, which is offi cially “pardoned” and sent to a local petting zoo.
In 2002, the Federation persuaded federal bureaucrats to change federally funded
school lunch program regulations in a way that increased the allowable amount of
turkey in various entrees. The policy change resulting from the Federation’s lob-
bying eff orts attracted no publicity, which is precisely the point. When few people
know or care about a policy change, interest groups are able to dominate the policy-
making process.LEVEL OF CONFLICT
Confl ict can also make it diffi cult for interest groups to get what they want. Lobby-
ing is subject to two kinds of confl ict. One involves disagreements between inter-
est groups: some prefer spending more on a given program, some less. The other
involves diff erences between what a particular interest group wants and the pref-
erences of the general public. Both kinds of confl ict can work against the success
of a lobbying eff ort.^42
In the case of the National Turkey Federation, no one in the general public knew
about its proposal, and no interest group lobbied against it. In essence, bureaucrats
heard one group asking for something and, hearing no opposition, decided the pol-
icy change was worth making. The situation might have been diff erent if another
group—perhaps the American Pork Producers or the American Cattlemen—had
lobbied against the Turkey Federation. If so, satisfying one group would have
required displeasing at least one other group. Faced with this no-win situation,
bureaucrats or legislators would be less likely to give the group what it wanted.
The picture gets more complicated on highly confl ictual issues—those over
which public opinion is split and groups are active on all sides of the question. Con-
sider health care reform. The 2009–10 debate over health care reform attracted
many well-funded interest groups and coalitions, but there was no consen-
sus among members of Congress, interest groups, or the American public about
which policy changes were needed. Under these conditions, access doesn’t count
for much; legislators have a keen sense of the political costs of accommodating a
group’s demands. Moreover, policy changes are likely to refl ect a complex processWHILE MANY OBSERVERS CREDIT
lobbying by the pharmaceutical
industry for policies such as
the Medicare Prescription Drug
Benefi t (and its ban on importing
medicines), favorable public
opinion, the efforts of A ARP,
and bureaucrats’ independent
judgments probably had greater
infl uence on passing the Drug
Benefi t.