OVERSIGHT| 287
dent if he is of the opposite pa r ty. For exa mple, in President Bush’s
last two years, Democrats investigated fraud and cost overruns
in Defense Department contracts to rebuild Iraq that went to
corporations with close Republican Party ties. In 2011, Repub-
licans used their oversight powers to highlight policy failures in
the Obama administration such as “Operation Fast and Furious”
(a Justice Department program to sell guns to drug dealers that
could then be tracked to Mexican drug lords; the program went
horribly awry when hundreds of the guns went missing and two
were found where a Border Patrol agent was killed).^26 However,
the basic motivation for oversight is to ensure that laws are imple-
mented properly.
Congress may use several mechanisms to accomplish this goal;
we examine these in Chapter 11 but briefl y describe them here. First, the bluntest
instrument is the power of the purse. If members of Congress think an agency is
not properly implementing their programs, they can simply cut off the funds. How-
ever, this approach is rarely used because budget cuts often end up cutting good
aspects of the agency along with the bad.
Second, Congress may hold hearings and investigations. By summoning
administration offi cials and agency heads to a public hearing, Congress can
use the media spotlight to focus attention on problems within the bureaucracy
or on issues that have been overlooked. For example, the economic meltdown of
2008–09 produced dozens of hearings on topics ranging from the bailout of the
auto industry to the use of TARP (Troubled Assets Relief Program, another gov-
ernment bailout program) money by fi nancial institutions, executive pay in the
fi nancial sector, the housing market and subprime mortgage crises, and account-
ability of the Federal Reserve. This type of oversight is known as fi re alarm over-
sight—that is, members wait until there is a crisis before they spring to action.^27
It is in contrast to so-called police patrol oversight, which involves constant
vigilance in overseeing the bureaucracy. Of the two, fi re alarm oversight is more
common because Congress does not have the resources to constantly monitor the
entire bureaucracy.
Third, Congress may use legislative vetoes. In writing laws Congress often
gives the bureaucracy broad discretion over how to implement policies, because
it is impossible for Congress to foresee every scenario that might arise. However,
Congress is reluctant to give full control to the implementing agencies. Legislative
vetoes resolve this dilemma by allowing Congress to overturn bureaucratic deci-
sions. In 1983 the Supreme Court ruled that many forms of legislative vetoes are
unconstitutional.^28 Despite this ruling, Congress has enacted more than 400 new
legislative vetoes since 1983.^29
Finally, the Senate exercises specifi c control over other executive functions
through its constitutional responsibilities to provide “advice and consent”
on presidential appointments and approval of treaties. The Senate typically
defers to the president on these matters, but it may assert its power, especially
when constituent interests are involved. Current examples include the Senate’s
increasing skepticism about free trade agreements negotiated by the president’s
trade representatives and its holds on presidential nominations.
The ultimate in congressional oversight is the process of removing the presi-
dent, vice president, other civil offi cers, or federal judges through impeachment.
The House and Senate share this power. The House issues articles of impeachment,
which outline the charges against the offi cial, and the Senate conducts the trial of
legislative veto A form of over-
sight in which Congress overturns
bureaucratic decisions.
THE CEOS OF GENERAL MOTORS, FORD,
and Chrysler testify before the
Senate Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs Committee about
a proposed $34 billion federal
bailout for the auto industry.
When members of Congress took
this extraordinary step in 2009,
they wanted to make sure that
taxpayers’ money would be
wisely spent.