308 CHAPTER 10|THE PRESIDENCY
is doing. On the other hand, the president and his staff need to be able to com-
municate freely, discussing alternative strategies and hypothetical situations or
national security secrets without fearing that they will be forced to reveal conver-
sations that could become politically embarrassing or costly. (Suppose the discus-
sions included political strategies for the next election or a sarcastic remark about
jailing their opponents.) Moreover, allowing aides to testify before Congress is
enormously time-consuming and can be costly for the aides if they hire lawyers.
Even when executive privilege does not apply (if Congress has not issued a sub-
poena), presidents can and do refuse to provide information to the media, Con-
gress, or the general public. For example, despite President Obama’s promises to
increase the transparency of government, his administration did not disclose the
specifi cs of White House negotiations over health care reform, announcing details
of the deal only after it was carried out. However, this reluctance is not surprising
given the confl ict over heath care reform. Disclosure of what participants said in
meetings and what they were willing to trade away would be politically embar-
rassing. In this sense, some confi dentiality may be necessary for a president to
arrive at the compromises needed to change government policy.
The President as Politician
As head of the executive branch, the president has considerable infl uence over
policy. However, much of what presidents do (or want to do) requires support
from legislators, bureaucrats, and ordinary citizens. As a result, the presidency is
an inherently political offi ce. The president has to take into account the political
consequences of his decisions—both for his own re-election prospects and for the
re-election of legislators from his party. He must also contend with the fact that
achieving his policy goals often requires bargaining and compromising with oth-
ers, both inside and outside government.
Presidents try to deliver on their campaign promises not only because they
believe in them but also because fulfi lling them is politically advantageous. For
example, one of President Obama’s central campaign promises was to work to
restore economic growth, a promise partly fulfi lled by the enactment of economic
stimulus legislation in 2010. While these measures did not restore robust economic
growth by the 2012 elections, Obama gained support from voters who believed that
the measures had prevented a more extreme economic downturn. Obama also ben-
efi ted from the positive impact of the stimulus in swing states such as Ohio.
The president also typically keeps a close eye on the presidential approval
rating, a survey-based measurement of the percentage of the public who thinks
he is doing a good job in offi ce. Particularly during his fi rst term, one of the presi-
dent’s primary concerns is to build a record that will get him re-elected, and
keeping approval levels as high as possible is a crucial part of this strategy. Fig-
ure 10.1, which shows approval ratings for the last six presidents who ran for re-
election, reveals that fi rst-term presidents with less than 50 percent approval are
in real trouble. No recent president has been re-elected with less than a 50 percent
approval rating.
THE PRESIDENT AS PARTY LEADER
The president is the unoffi cial head of his political party and generally picks the
day-to-day leadership of the party, or at least has considerable infl uence over the
presidential approval
rating The percentage of Ameri-
cans who feel that the president is
doing a good job in offi ce.