CONCLUSION| 349vide socially benefi cial results. For example, regulations restricting
pollution have led to dramatic increases in air and water quality
throughout the United States.
Dysfunctional bureaucratic behavior can also arise from the
problem of political control. Overly specifi c directives may prevent
bureaucrats from pursuing what they consider the most eff ective
course of action, but the president and his appointees are genuinely
worried about being undercut by unelected bureaucrats who may
disagree with their plans. Similarly, government reorganizations
such as those that occurred during the formation of the Department
of Homeland Security may be intentionally designed to bring about
some bureaucratic “failures” as priorities shift and agencies’ goals
are redefi ned. For example, no one expects the Coast Guard to take
on new responsibilities without shifting resources away from the
jobs it is already doing. In a sense, the Guard has fallen short in its
routine patrol mission since it became part of Homeland Security.
But the reason for moving the Guard into the new department was to refocus its
eff orts on port security. From the viewpoint of political control, the reorganization
worked exactly as planned.
In sum, when government agencies do things that seem counterproductive, it
would be wrong to conclude that the agencies are inept or willfully shirking their
responsibilities. Rather, they may be doing the best they can to achieve formida-
ble goals, carrying out procedures that are often—but not always—productive, or
responding to directives from elected offi cials.
Conclusion
Bureaucrats implement government policy—often in situations where the prob-
lems and potential solutions are vast and poorly understood, and in the face of
sharp disagreements about what government should do. On the government’s
behalf, bureaucrats spend money on everything from paper clips to aircraft car-
riers. They formulate regulations that determine what can be created, produced,
transported, bought, sold, consumed, and disposed of in America. Elected offi cials
want to control what bureaucrats do while also tapping into their expertise on pol-
icy mat ters. In t his way, con fl ict over public policy often translates into confl icting
ideas about what bureaucrats should do, resulting in complex, often contradictory
mandates and directions imposed on those workers.
These characteristics of the bureaucracy and the fundamentally political
nature of bureaucrats’ jobs explain many cases of ineptitude and red tape. Some-
times bureaucrats simply make mistakes, choosing the wrong policy because they
lack full information about the tasks they were given. Bureaucrats may drag their
feet when they oppose their tasks on policy grounds. Policies may refl ect direct
orders given by elected offi cials or political appointees. Attempts at political con-
trol also shape the structure of the bureaucracy, from infl uencing which agencies
function independently and which ones fall within executive departments, to
determining the qualifi cations for commissioners and agency heads and the rules
they must follow when making decisions.
MANY GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
work as intended. An increase
in regulatory attention to
environmental protection and
cleanup of polluted sites has
dramatically improved water
quality nationwide, including that
of the Hudson River in New York,
shown here.