American Politics Today - Essentials (3rd Ed)

STUDY GUIDE|^353

CONTROLLING THE BUREAUCRACY

E Explain how Congress and the president oversee the executive branch. Pages 343–49

SUMMARY

With their expertise, bureaucrats have the power to signifi -
cantly infl uence government policy. This creates a dilemma
for elected offi cials, who want to enjoy the benefi ts of the
expertise while retaining control of the bureaucracy. Law-
makers can generally organize agencies and monitor their
behavior to reduce, but not eliminate, bureaucratic drift.

KEY TERMS

bureaucratic drift (p. 343)

oversight (p. 344)

police patrol oversight (p. 346)

fi re alarm oversight (p. 346)

CRITICAL THINKING AND DISCUSSION

Why might bureaucrats pay more attention to orders and
directives from members of Congress than those from the
president or his political appointees?

PRACTICE QUIZ QUESTIONS

12. When bureaucrats pursue their own goals rather
    than assignments from offi ceholders, this is called
    .
    a) an iron triangle
    b) regulatory capture

c) the problem of control

d) turkey farming

e) bureaucratic drift

13. Giving direct orders to bureaucrats the
    infl uence of their policy expertise and
    the potential for incrementalism.
    a) limits; reduces
    b) increases; reduces
    c) limits; increases
    d) increases; increases
    e) limits; has no eff ect on


14. While police patrol oversight has the advantage of
    being , it has the drawback of being
    .
    a) aff ordable; unresponsive
    b) responsive; costly
    c) aff ordable; generally unnecessary
    d) responsive; unpopular
    e) aff ordable; ineff ective

S PRACTICE ONLINE

“Big Think” video exercise: Sen. George Mitchell on

Congress and Bureaucracy

SUGGESTED READING

Aaron, Henry J. Politics and the Professors: The Great Society in
Perspective. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1978.
Brehm, John, and Scott Gates. Working, Shirking and Sabotage.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998.
Carpenter, Daniel P. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy:
Reputations, Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive
Agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2001.
Epstein, David, and Sharyn O’Halloran. Delegating Powers: A
Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under
Separate Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999.
Huber, John D., and Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion? The
Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Lewis, David E. The Politics of Presidential Appointments:
Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Light, Paul. A Government Well-Executed: Public Service and

Public Performance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution

Press, 2003.

McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast.

“Structure and Process as Solutions to the Politician’s

Principal–Agency Problem,” Virginia Law Review 74 (1989):

431–82.

Miller, Gary. Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of

Hierarchy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Moe, Terry M. “Political Control and the Power of the Agent.”

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22 (2006): 1–21.

Nelson, Michael. “A Short, Ironic History of American National

Bureaucracy.” Journal of Politics 44 (1982): 747–78.

Skowronek, Stephen. Building a New American State: The

Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do

and Why They Do It. 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books, 2000.