American Politics Today - Essentials (3rd Ed)

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A46 ENDNOTES



  1. David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design:
    Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureau-
    cracy, 1946–1997 (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press,
    2003).

  2. David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers
    (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).


You Decide
a. For details on this example, see http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/business/companies/solyndra/index.html
(accessed 4/11/12).

CHAPTER 11


  1. Brad Plumer and Ezra Klein, “Analysis: Little-Known Bureau-
    crat Is Most Powerful Man in Housing Policy,” Washington
    Post, August 31, 2011, p. A1.

  2. Perry Bacon Jr., “House Passes Defense Spending Bill,” Wash-
    ington Post, December 16, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost
    .com/44/2009/12/house-passes-defense-spending.html
    (accessed 2/8/10).

  3. The original quote is from Robert Dahl and was used in this
    context in David E. Lewis, Presidents and the Politics of Agency
    Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government
    (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

  4. For a history of the Food and Drug Administration, see
    John  P.  Swann, FDA History Offi ce, “History of the FDA,”
    http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/section2.html
    (accessed 7/15/08).

  5. For details, see Cornelius Kerwin, Rulemaking: How Govern-
    ment Agencies Write Law and Make Policy (Washington, DC:
    CQ Press, 1999).

  6. Andrew Pollack, “New Sense of Caution at FDA,” New York
    Times, September 29, 2006.

  7. There are two exceptions. A patient can enroll in a clinical
    trial for a new drug during the approval process, but there
    is a good chance that he or she will get a placebo or a previ-
    ously approved treatment rather than the drug being tested.
    The FDA does allow companies to provide some experimen-
    tal drugs to patients who cannot participate in a trial but only
    those drugs that have passed early screening trials.

  8. Susan Okie, “Access before Approval—A Right to Take Experi-
    mental Drugs?” New England Journal of Medicine 355 (2004):
    437–40.

  9. For details, see the U.S. General Services Administration site
    at http://www.gsa.gov.

  10. Michael Lipsky, Street Level Bureaucracy (New York: Russell
    Sage Foundation, 1983).

  11. Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The
    Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920
    (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

  12. Terry Moe, “An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congres-
    sional Dominance,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 4 (1987):
    475–98.

  13. For evidence, see Edwards, On Deaf Ears.

  14. Edwards, On Deaf Ears.

  15. Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential
    Leadership, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quar-
    terly Press, 1993).

  16. David Carr, “Obama’s Social Networking Was the Real Revo-
    lution,” New York Times, November 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes
    .com/2008/11/09/technology/09iht-carr.1.17652000.html
    (accessed 11/2/10).

  17. Associated Press, “Bush Regains Power after Colonoscopy,”
    New York Times, July 21, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/
    us/AP-Bush-Colonoscopy.html?hp (accessed 4/29/08).

  18. John Hart, The Presidential Branch: From Washington to Clin-
    ton, 2nd ed. (Chatham, NY: Chatham House, 1995).

  19. John Hart, “President Clinton and the Politics of Symbolism:
    Cutting the White House Staff ,” Political Science Quarterly
    110 (1995): 385–403.

  20. Michael Fletcher, “White House Had Drug Offi cials Appear
    with GOP Candidates,” Washington Post, July 18, 2007, p. A8.

  21. David E. Lewis, “Staffi ng Alone: Unilateral Action and the
    Politicization of the Executive Offi ce of the President, 1988–
    2004,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 35 (2005): 496–514.

  22. Charles E. Walcott and Karen M. Hult, “White House Staff
    Size: Explanations and Implications,” Presidential Studies
    Quarterly 29 (1999): 638–56.

  23. Karen M. Hult and Charles E. Walcott, Empowering the White
    House: Governance under Nixon, Ford, and Carter (Lawrence,
    KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004).

  24. David E. Lewis, The Politics of Presidential Appointments:
    Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance (Princeton,
    NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

  25. For a series of articles detailing Cheney’s role, see “Angler:
    The Cheney Vice Presidency,” Washington Post, June 24–27,
    2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/cheney (accessed 4/29/08).

  26. For example, see David Talbot, “Creepier Than Nixon,” Salon,
    March 31, 2004, http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/
    2004/03/31/dean/index.html (accessed 4/29/08).

  27. David Kirkpatrick, “Question of Timing on Bush’s Push on
    Earmarks,” New York Times, January 29, 2008.

  28. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, The Pacifi cus-
    Helvidius Debates of 1793–1794: Toward the Completion of the
    American Founding, ed. Martin J. Frisch (1793; repr. India-
    napolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2007).

  29. Richard E. Neustart, Presidential Power and the Modern Presi-
    dents (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).

  30. Terry M. Moe and William G. Howell, “The Presidential Power
    of Unilateral Action,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organi-
    zation 15 (1999): 132–46.

  31. Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: Uni-
    versity Press of Kansas, 2004); James M. Lindsay, “Deference
    and Defi ance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive–Legislative
    Relations in Foreign Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly
    33:3 (2003): 530–46; Lawrence Margolis, Executive Agree-
    ments and Presidential Power in Foreign Policy (New York:
    Praeger, 1985), 209–32.

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