A48 ENDNOTES
- Daniel P. Carpenter, “The Gatekeeper: Organizational Reputa-
tion and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA,” unpublished
paper, Harvard University, 2006. - Terry M. Moe, “Political Control and the Power of the Agent,”
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22 (2006): 1–29. - See David Weil, “OSHA: Beyond the Politics,” Frontline,
January 9, 2003,www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
workplace/osha/weil.html (accessed 7/17/08).
CHAPTER 12- Ralph Ketcham, The Antifederalist Papers and the Consti-
tutional Convention Debates (New York: Penguin Putnam,
2003), p. 304. - Lester S. Jayson, ed., The Constitution of the United States of
America: Analysis and Interpretation (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Offi ce, 1973), p. 585. - David G. Savage, Guide to the Supreme Court, 4th ed. (Wash-
ington, DC: CQ Press, 2004), pp. 5–7. - Winfi eld H. Rose, “Marbury v. Madison: How John Marshall
Changed History by Misquoting the Constitution,” Political
Science and Politics 36:2 (April 2003): 209–14. Rose argues
that in a key quotation in the case, Marshall intentionally
left out a clause of the Constitution that suggests that Con-
gress did have the power to expand the original jurisdic-
tion of the Court. Other constitutional scholars reject this
argument. - Marbury v. Madison, 1 CR. (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
- Revisionist historians, legal scholars, and political scientists
have challenged the landmark status of Marbury v. Madison.
For example, Michael Stokes Paulsen’s Michigan Law Review
article points out that Marbury was not cited in subsequent
Supreme Court cases as a precedent for judicial review until
the late nineteenth century. Legal scholars in the early twen-
tieth century were the fi rst to promote the idea that Marbury
was a landmark decision. Paulsen also notes that when the
opinion was delivered in 1803, it was not controversial. Even
the Jeff ersonian Democrats, who were at odds with Marshall’s
Federalists, thought that it was a reasonable decision and not
the institutional power-grab that modern accounts describe.
Finally, Marshall made a very narrow case for judicial review,
arguing that the Supreme Court could declare legislation that
was contrary to the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution
null and void only if it concerned judicial powers. Revisionists
argue that what appear to be broad claims of judicial power in
Marbury (e.g., the Court has the power “to say what the law
is”) are taken out of the context of a much more narrow claim
of power. Michael Stokes Paulsen, “Judging Judicial Review:
Marbury in the Modern Era: The Irrepressible Myth of Mar-
bury,” Michigan Law Review 101 (August 2003): 2706–43. - Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
- However, in 2011 the Court struck down any class-action
claim unless there was “convincing proof of a companywide
discriminatory pay and promotion policy”—statistical evi-
dence of pay disparities would not suffi ce (David Savage, - Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Liebcap, The Federal Civil Ser-
vice System and the Problem of Bureaucracy (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1993). - For details on the Senior Executive Service, see the Offi ce of
Personnel Management site at http://www.opm.gov/ses. - For the details of the Hatch Act, see Daniel Engber, “Can Karl
Rove Plot Campaign Strategy on the Government’s Dime?”
Slate, April 21, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2140418 (accessed
7/16/08). - Stephen Labaton and Edmund Andrews, “White House Calls
Political Briefi ngs Legal,” New York Times, April 27, 2007. - Andrew C. Revkin, “Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to
Silence Him,” New York Times, January 29, 2006. - Andrew C. Revkin, “A Young Bush Appointee Resigns His Post
at NASA,” New York Times, February 8, 2006. - Andrew C. Revkin, “NASA’s Goals Delete Mention of Home
Planet,” New York Times, July 22, 2006. - John D. Huber and Charles R. Shipan, Deliberate Discretion?
The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). - David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers:
A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under
Separate Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999). - Charles E. Lindbloom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’ ”
Public Administration Review, 19 (1959): 79–88. - Barry R. Weingast, “Caught in the Middle: The President, Con-
gress, and the Political-Bureaucratic System,” in Institutions
of American Democracy: The Executive Branch, ed. Joel D.
Aberbach and Mark A. Peterson (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006). - Keith Whittington and Daniel P. Carpenter, “Executive Power
in American Institutional Development,” Perspectives on Poli-
tics 1 (2003): 495–513. - Dara Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, and Barry R. Wein-
gast, “Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Politi-
cal Design of Legal Mandates,” Stanford Law Review 59:3
(2006): 673–760. - Federal Communications Commission, “FCC Commissioners,”
April 1, 2008, http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners (accessed 7/17/08). - Charles Shipan, Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups,
Congress, and Communication Policy (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 2000). - Roger Noll, Mathew McCubbins, and Barry Weingast,
“Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Con-
trol,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3 (1987):
243–77. - Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional
Oversight Overlooked: Fire Alarms vs. Police Patrols,” Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science 28 (1984): 165–79. - McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight
Overlooked.” - Steven J. Balla and John R. Wright, “Interest Groups, Advisory
Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy,”
American Journal of Political Science 45 (2001): 799–812.