ment of the point (which is, as we shall see, rather unfair to
Austin): “For a context to be exhaustively determinable, in the
sense demanded by Austin, it at least would be necessary for
the conscious intention to be totally present and actually
transparent for itself and others, since it is a determining focal
point of the context” ( 327 ).
Derrida asserts that Austin lets “the category of intention
govern the entire scene and the entire system of utterances”
( 326 ). But Austin does not ride intention in this way; far from
it. Instead, he suggests that self-interested moralizers exploit
intention as an excuse, when in fact it is circumstances that
govern meaning (rather than the speaker’s consciousness).
Here is Austin, near the beginning ofHow to Do Things with
Words:“One who says ‘promising is not merely a matter of ut-
tering words! It is an inward and spiritual act!’ is apt to appear
a solid moralist standing out against a generation of superficial
theorizers....Yet he provides...the bigamist with an excuse
for his ‘I do’ and the welsher with a defense for his ‘I bet.’ Ac-
curacy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying
thatour word is our bond”(How to Do 10 ).
If the circumstances are appropriate, then one actually
gets married by saying the required words: a performative ut-
terance. As Austin wittily (and strangely) puts it, “When I say,
before the registrar or altar, etc., ‘I do,’ I am not reporting on a
marriage, I am indulging in it” ( 6 ). Appropriate circumstances
include standing before a judge, priest, ship’s captain, or simi-
lar figure, having a marriage license handy, and so on. If one is
already married, or one is an actor playing the bride or groom
in a stage play, the ceremony “misfires” (as Austin terms it).
Consciousness does play a role, but a circumscribed one,
in determining appropriate conditions for the marriage cere-
mony. If you are deluded enough not to know that a marriage
Plato, Austin, Nietzsche, Freud 161