10 Introduction
is on the psyche of the author, remains more useful than the
deconstructionist idea that misreading occurs within texts and
that authorial personality is a mere illusion.
Derrida’s knowing skepticism relieves us of responsibil-
ity for our words and deeds: he reduces us to mere parts of
the signifying machine. By contrast, Freud and Austin, de-
mystifiers of the self-confident ego, still give the self a central
place in the world. They are philosophical detectives, intent on
figuring out why we do what we do. They recognize the mo-
ments when we are forced to improvise, even to write our own
script. Sometimes—often—systems fail, giving us the task of
being original. Our condition, vexing and promising as it is,
can only be understood by admitting the psychological di-
mension that Derrida tried so hard to exclude from his work.
Avoiding the psyche is a continual temptation of philos-
ophy. Derrida gave in to this temptation, but then searched for
a way out of the diminished version of philosophical thinking
that resulted. In doing so he inadvertently, but crucially,
pointed to the reasons why psychology and philosophy remain
bound to each other.^4