formation that will contribute to the indeterminacy of subjectivation.
The word ‘subject’ in Deleuze and Guattari is always viewed a bit sus-
piciously. There is never any subjectivity, but always subjectivation.
Any instance of subjectivation is a Body without Organs, that is, an
unexpressed potentiality and becoming.
Subjectivation presupposes the subject in an illusory way, but in
reality, it places into being the subject’s provisional determinations
even as it immediately surpasses and recombines them. This is also
how the Body without Organs presupposes the body but, at the same
time, determines its articulations in physical space through intention-
ality and relations of semantic proximity with the other.******Even here I see a question of semiochemistry: subjectivation in fact is the
assemblage of the enunciator through the process of enunciation. We
think that we speak through the will of our subjectivity, but in reality, the
language that we are speaking speaks to us, and the relations in which we
are caught are our process of subjectivation. There is no subject of enunci-
ation that exists before the enunciation itself. It is the enunciation that
brings into being the organism as subject, that subjectivizes us; and any
subjectivation is the start of a new process of dissipation bringing us back
to the condition of egg, of Body without Organs, of becoming other.
The expression ‘becoming other’ always refers to the same problem:
subjectivation is becoming other, that is, the interaction between inde-
terminacies that are provisionally determined precisely through their
interaction. In this way we can define the Body without Organs.
The Sanskrit word asamskrtaitself defines this very thing, the inde-
terminacy, what has not attained the state of determinacy.
Whatever has not attained the state of determinacy is one among
innumerable states of becoming other.
A subject of enunciation does not exist; what exists is a reciprocal
implication of the enunciation and of the process that enunciates.
The Body without Organs is so difficult to define simply because
it concerns the very undefinability of the subject. And when I say
undefinability, I am not referring to a vague and undetermined con-
dition, but rather to a condition of possibility, exactly to the egg. Because
on the egg we can already read a map of intensity, of directions, of lines
of flight. This is the egg: not yet a subject, not yet a constituted pro-
cess. Neither is it a code that predetermines the organism’s fate, but
only a limitation of the infinite field of possibilities.100 Thought, Friendship and Visionary Cartography9780230_221192_10_cha09.pdf 10/3/08 11:35 AM Page 100