Action, Passion, not treated in detail in Aristotle, and retained in the Categories the final
chapters (10–15), the so-called Post-Praedicamenta, although they had been rejected by
Andronikos. He devoted a book on the category of relation (pros ti), partly in polemic against
the Stoics. Boëthos’ theoretical tendencies have often been regarded as materialistic or
naturalistic: he wanted to start the curriculum with physics (and not with logic, as
Andronikos did) because this is the most familiar field of knowledge for us (Philop., in Cat.:
ibid., 5.16–18); he maintained that only matter and compounds are substances, since they
are not said of substrate (kath’ hupokeimenou) nor they are in a substrate (en hupokeimeno ̄i, cf.
S, in Cat. = CAG 8 [1907] 78.4–20), whereas forms belong to other categories,
such as quality or quantity; he regarded universal genera (including P’s ideas) as pos-
terior to individuals (see Dexippos, in Cat. = CAG 4.2 [1888] 45.12–28, S, in Met. =
CAG 6.1 [1902] 106.5–7); he distinguished matter and substrate, thus preparing Alexander’s
theory of a matter (see Simpl., in Phys. = CAG 9 [1882] 211.13–23, and cf. e.g. Alex., DA 3 =
CAG S.2.1 [1887] 21–4.4). According to Gottschalk (vs. Moraux), Boëthos the Peripatetic
(not B S S) is the philosopher criticized in P’ lost
books Against Boethus on the Soul (fr. in E Praep. Ev. 11.28, pp. 62.25ff. Mras) for
having rejected the proof for the immortality of the soul as held in Plato’s Phaedo 79 – 81.
E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung 3.1 (1865) 624–627; K. Prantl,
Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande (1955) 1.540–544; Moraux (1973) 1.143–179, with L. Taran’s review,
Gnomon 46 (1981) 732–734; H.B. Gottschalk, “Boethus’ psychology and the Neoplatonists,” Phronesis
31 (1986) 243–257; Idem (1987) 1107–1110, 1116–1119; DPA 2 (1994) 126–130, J.-P. Schneider.
Silvia Fazzo
Boëthos of Sido ̄n (Stoic) (175 – 125 BCE)
Stoic, student of D B, held several rather unorthodox opinions for a
Stoic, including denial of the living kosmos and the end-of-the-world conflagration. He
also argued that the kosmos was eternal and incorruptible, that the substance of god is
the sphere of the fixed stars (or aithe ̄r), and that everything happens according to Fate.
He investigated the causes of meteorological phenomena, and he seems also to have said
that soul is a mixture of air and fire. Books On Fate, On Nature, and a commentary on
A’ Phainomena are attested.
Ed.: SVF 3.265–7.
Daryn Lehoux
Bola ̄s (250 BCE – 540 CE)
A A, 7.106 (CMG 8.2, p. 371), records his collyrium, a compound of
psimuthion, saffron, opium, fresh starch, and gum acacia, in water. For the rare name,
cf. only LGPN 4.73.
Fabricius (1726) 103.
PTK
Bo ̄los of Mende ̄s (ca 250 – 115 BCE)
Paradoxographer and author on magic, thought coeval with or after K and
before the paradoxographer A.
BOE ̈THOS OF SIDO ̄N (STOIC)