makes them unverifiable and impedes communication between doctor and patient. Medi-
cine’s traditional method – reasoning based upon observation – is sufficient. Philosophical
theories are attacked, especially those narrowing etiologies to one or two of such unmixed
substances as the hot, cold, wet, and dry. The author, however, employs hupotheseis himself
(Lloyd), asserting that innumerable substances (e.g., bitterness, sweetness), properly mixed,
constitute the healthy body (cf. A). Illness results from the separation of one of
the humors, or from the body’s own structures.
Singling out E, the author also refutes those asserting that medicine requires
first a knowledge of Nature, claiming the converse: Nature is understood only via medicine.
Doctors require such knowledge, but it is subordinate to medicine.
The defense of medicine’s status as a tekhne ̄ echoes sophistic debates (cf. On the Art, On
Breaths, O S D). Ideally, a tekhne ̄ has a theoretical foundation and is
unfailingly successful, in contrast with chance (tukhe ̄). Here, however, medicine’s inevitable
(though infrequent) fallibility does not diminish its technical status (it surpasses chance),
whose attainment is attributed to empirically-based reasoning requiring no hupotheseis.
The author traces medicine’s origins to primitive man’s discovery that many illnesses
were prevented by eating mild, cooked foods rather than the strong, raw ones suited to
animals. Expertise in treating illness came later. Early doctors’ regimens of restricted food
intake, weak gruels, and liquid nourishment followed the same reasoning as the primitive
discoveries. Good doctors know that individual constitutions have individual dietary
requirements.
E attributed the treatise to H. Modern scholars have suggested
various schools and figures as the author’s specific targets. The particular sense of “hupoth-
esis” – otherwise known only in P (Meno) and later authors (and rare in any sense before
Plato [Lloyd]) – clouds this issue and the dating of the text.
Ed.: Littré v. 1; J. Jouanna, Hippocrate: De l’Ancienne médecine (CUF 1990).
G.E.R. Lloyd, “Who is Attacked in On Ancient Medicine?” Phronesis 8 (1963) 108–126; repr. in Methods
and Problems in Greek Science (1991) with new introduction; M.J. Schiefsky, trans., Hippocrates on ancient
medicine = SAM 28 (2005).
Julie Laskaris
Hippokratic Corpus, Aphoristic Works (ca 430 – 370 BCE)
Aphorisms (Littré 4) and Coan Prognoses (Littré 5). These two compilations are alike: both
comprise lengthy collections of disjointed sayings, conveying useful information for the
doctor. The content of the latter is somewhat more restricted, dealing primarily with prog-
nostic guidance, though this relates to a wide range of diseases and conditions; it is also
more clearly organized by subject matter. The guidance ranges from common-sense rules of
thumb to superstitious observations. There is some overlap in content, but differences in
vocabulary and modes of expression suggest that the collections had different origins; Coan
Prognoses is related to Prorrhetic 1. Both collections, especially Aphorisms, were subject to much
reprinting, being cited and followed by practicing physicians until the 19th c.
Humors (Littré 5). The title, based on a passing reference to humors in the first sentence,
is misleading. The work is a collection of aphorisms on miscellaneous subjects, notably on
signs and symptoms to be observed by the physician. Particular attention is paid to the
nature of body fluids and evacuations, and to signs which indicate medical crisis; some
attention is given to seasonal factors in causing disease. The expression is frequently obscure
HIPPOKRATIC CORPUS, APHORISTIC WORKS