Ed.: I. Garofalo, Anonymi Medici de Morbis Acutis et Chroniis (1997) = SAM 12.
van der Eijk (1999) 295–331; BNP 1 (2002) 713–714, V. Nutton.
PTK
Parmenide ̄s of Elea (ca 490 – ca 450 BCE)
Born ca 520 BCE, and perhaps the most influential Pre-Socratic philosopher. In a hexameter
poem, Parmenide ̄s puts into the mouth of an unnamed goddess a criticism of “mortal”
thought and a set of claims about what truly is: coming-to-be and passing-away are both
impossible, what-is is complete, whole, perfect, unchanging, and of a single kind. Mortals go
astray in assuming that what-is can not be (i.e. can come to be, pass away, or change). A
fundamental problem in interpreting Parmenide ̄s is determining the subject of Parmenide ̄s’
discourse. The metaphysical arguments have been seen by some as rejecting altogether the
possibility of inquiry such as that practiced by the Milesians ( T, A, and
A) and recommended by X. These interpretations take Parmenide ̄s
to be claiming that there exists only Being: a single, unmovable, unchangeable entity. Yet,
Parmenide ̄s can also be understood as offering a corrective to earlier scientific inquiry: on
this view, Parmenide ̄s inquires into the nature of that which genuinely is and so is genuinely
knowable. In the Ale ̄theia section (B2–B8.50) Parmenide ̄s gives an analysis of the nature or
essence of a thing, explaining what it is to be such an entity. Only explanations of experi-
ence grounded in fundamental entities of the right sort (meeting the criteria for what-is) can
hope to succeed; this offers a solution to the problem posed by Xenophane ̄s’ rejection of
divine revelation as a source of knowledge. Thus, Parmenide ̄s’ arguments allow for a
rational science grounded in metaphysically acceptable entities. Parmenide ̄s himself claims
that one who understands his account will “know all things” including cosmological claims,
and will be able to evaluate and reject unsuccessful accounts of what-is. He himself explains
the sensible world (in the Doxa section) and was arguably the first to assert that the Moon
lacks its own light but reflects light from the Sun. Despite apparently allowing for properly
grounded cosmological explanation, he insists on the fundamental role in knowledge and
explanation of self-justifying thought uncontaminated by sense experience.
Ed.: DK 28; L. Tarán Parmenides (1965); D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea: Fragments (1984).
D.J. Furley, “Parmenides of Elea,” in P. Edwards, ed. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1967) 6.47–51;
A.P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (1971); ECP 363 – 369, Idem; Patricia Curd, The Legacy of
Parmenides: Eleatic Monism and Later Presocratic Thought (1998; corrected paper edition with new intro-
ductory chapter, 2004); A. Hermann, To Think Like God (2004); SEP “Parmenides,” John Palmer; R.
McKirahan, “Signs and Arguments in Parmenides B8,” in Patricia Curd and D.W. Graham, edd.,
The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy (2008: forthcoming).
Patricia Curd
Parmenio ̄n (ca 310 – 280 BCE)
Architect of the Serapeion in Alexandria and the Iaso ̄neion in Abde ̄ra, and cited by
V 9.8.1 for having invented a type of sundial, the pros ta historoumena, usable at
preset latitudes (contrast A).
RE 18.4 (1949) 1567–1569 (#5), H. Riemann; D.J.deS. Price, “Portable Sundials in Antiquity,
including an Account of a New Example from Aphrodisias,” Centaurus 14 (1969) 242–266.
PTK
PARMENIDE ̄S OF ELEA