The Economist January 8th 2022 Finance & economics 63markets. The greenbond standard, for
one, is expectedtousethetaxonomyasits
benchmarkforeligibility.Thecommission
will probablyalsousetheclassificationas
it doles moneyouttomemberstatesfrom
its RecoveryFund,someofwhichislinked
to greenery.
The degreeofdetailandstringencyof
Europe’s approach couldhelp make the
taxonomytheglobalgoldstandard.Other
countriesoutsidetheblocareworkingon
schemes oftheirown.Eachwillprobably
be moulded by political compromises,
geostrategicconcernsandcarbonpledges.
But foreign companies, asset managers
and bankscouldendupadoptingtheeu’s
taxonomyanyway,becausetheirEuropean
clients mayneedthemtoreporttheright
data, so asto producetheirowndisclo
sures. Somemaylobbytheirowngovern
ments to limitdivergence.
Whetherallthisisenoughtochannel
funds towardstherightinvestmentsisan
other question.Oneimmediate problem
relates to implementation: because of
missed deadlines,greenfinancefirmsare
being askedtoreportontheircompliance
with the taxonomybeforecompaniesare
required toprovidetheunderlying data,
making thejobdifficult.
A bigger drawbackisthetaxonomy’s
limited coverage.Atpresentitappliestoa
subset ofeconomicactivities.Disclosure
requirementsalsoletsmallpubliccompa
nies, andallprivateones,offthehook.
Morningstar,a researchfirm,reckonsit
will affectjusthalfoffundassetsintheeu
(excluding private vehicles). That leaves
much inthedark atatimewhenlisted
giants, includingminersandutilities,are
rushing todivest theirdirtiestassetsto
private investors.Moremaycometolight
as the eu’s reportingrequirementsexpand
to cover newcompanies,some ofthem
private. Butthatwilltaketime.
The biggestproblemliesintheflawed
expectationthatthemereexistenceofthe
taxonomywillalterinvestors’preferences.
A project’sgreeneryisjust“onedatapoint”,
says DavidHenryDoyleofs&p, arating
agency. Creditworthiness, interest rates
and earningsprospectsmaymattermore.
The classification,notably,createsnoin
centive forbackinggreenassetsthatare
starved of funding, such as lowcarbon
steel or electriccarchargingstations.In
stead investorsmaycontinuetochasesafe,
liquid assetssuchaswindorsolarplants,
jacking upprices.Greenisgood,butitis
not enough.n
America’sfinancialrulesRegulatory flex
“P
owergrab”.An“attempttopoliti
cise our regulators for their own
gain”. “Extremist destruction ofinstitu
tionalnorms.”Therhetoricflyingaround
Washingtonsoundslikethecriticismonce
levelledagainstPresidentDonaldTrump
abouthotbuttonissuesfrombordersecu
ritytopollutioncontrols.Instead,itisRe
publicanswhohavedirectedthesebarbsat
Democrats in recent days, focused on
somethingthat,onthesurface,seemsfar
duller:theFederalDepositInsuranceCor
poration,theagencytaskedwithprotect
ingsaversfrombankbusts.
Astheheatedlanguagesuggests, the
stakesareinfacthigh.Alongwithinsuring
bankaccounts,thefdicisoneoftheinsti
tutions that approves bank mergers in
America.Thatmakesita crucialplayerin
theBidenadministration’splanstoimpose
stricterrulesonthefinancialsystem.And
theDemocratshavenowtakenfullcontrol
ofit aftera nastyboardroombattle.
Democrats alreadyheld three offive
seatsonthefdic’s board,whichshouldin
theoryhaveletthemhavetheirway.But
thechairwoman wasstill JelenaMcWil
liams,a respectedlawyerappointedbyMr
Trump.Shehadthepowertosettheagenda
formeetings.TheDemocratsallegedthat
sheusedittoblocka reviewofthepolicy
forbankmergers—whichshehasdenied.
The dispute exploded publicly last
monthwhentwoDemocratsontheboard,
including Rohit Chopra, director of the
ConsumerFinancialProtectionBureau,at
temptedtoworkaroundMsMcWilliams.
TheyannouncedthattheDemocraticma
jorityhadvotedfora reviewofbankmerg
errules,withouthersupport.MsMcWil
liamscounteredthattherehadnotbeena
validvote.InanarticleintheWallStreet
Journal, sheaccusedthemofplotting“a
hostiletakeoverofthefdic”. OnDecember
31st,withtheboardsplitbeyondrepair,she
announcedherresignation.
Theclashisa windowontotheefforts
ofprogressiveswithintheDemocraticpar
tytomaketheirmarkontheinstitutions
overseeingtheeconomy.MrChopraisan
allyofElizabethWarren,a senatorwhoisa
championoftheDemocrats’leftwing.Oth
ers liked by Ms Warren—notably, Lina
Khan,headoftheFederalTradeCommis
sion,andGaryGensler,chairmanoftheSe
curities and ExchangeCommission—are
alsoinkeyroles.
Progressiveshavenotwonallthepersonnel fights. Saule Omarova, their pre
ferred candidate to lead the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, a banking
regulator, withdrew from the nomination
process in December after Republicans de
criedherasa “radical”.Thereappointment
ofJeromePowellasheadofthe Federal Re
servewasanotherdisappointment for the
left.Yetwiththreeseatsopen on the Fed’s
board, progressives can make inroads.
Most crucially, MrBiden is expected to
nominate Sarah Bloom Raskin, another
preferredcandidateofMsWarren, as the
Fed’s vicechairwoman for supervision,
themostimportantregulatory post in the
financialsystem.
What do the progressives hope to
achieve?It isalreadyclearthat they want to
curbbigtech.Therowatthefdicreveals
thattheyalsointendtolimitthe formation
ofbigbanks.Fornowthereview of the
bankmergerpolicyisjusta request for in
formation.Butthequestionsposed by Mr
Chopraina blogpostinDecember leave lit
tle doubt about his desired direction:
“Should financial institutions that rou
tinely violate consumerprotection laws
beallowedtoexpandthrough acquisition?
...Howshouldwemakesurethat a merger
doesnotincreasetheriskthat a bank is too
bigtofail?”
Many bank analysts like the idea of
midsizedAmericanfirmsbanding togeth
ertotakeonthebigfour(JPMorgan Chase,
BankofAmerica,Citigroupand Wells Far
go).Progressiveswouldarguethat this gets
thingsbackwards. Ifthe power of giant
banksimperilsfinancialstability, the cre
ationofyetmoregiantswould only exacer
batethat,saysoneofficial.Other possible
changesincludeintegratingclimate con
cernsintofinancialregulation and beefing
upsomecapitalrequirements. Democrats
will,asever,needtosurmount legislative
andlobbyinghurdlestomake anyofthis
happen.Butwiththefdicnow firmlyin
theirgrasp,thepathisa littleclearer.nWASHINGTON, DC
A boardroom bust-up reveals Joe
Biden’s distaste for big banksMcWilliams makes an exitCorrection: In last week’s article on winners and
losers from the pandemic, the calculations
underlying our league table contained errors for
Japan’s household income and Greece’s public debt.
As a result, America should in fact be ranked ninth
(not tenth), Canada tenth (not 11th) and Japan 21st
(not equal 20th). Sorry. For the full ranking, see
economist.com/winnersandlosers