Leaders 9I
t is usuallya badsignif talksstartwithonesidebrandishing
a gun. And so it may prove when Russian diplomats meet their
North American and European peers next week, backed by
100,000 troops poised to invade Ukraine. At stake is the future of
a country that increasingly sees itself as part of the West, as well
as America’s role as the anchor of European security. As the cri
sis comes to a head, the risk of miscalculation is growing.
Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin, has already issued his de
mands for the talks, which will kick off between Russia and
America in Geneva on January 10th, move to Brussels for the
natoRussia Council two days later and wrap up at the Organisa
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe on January 13th. Mr
Putin wants natoto forswear all further expansion—every
where, and not just in Ukraine and Georgia, two former Soviet
states. America must no longer protect its allies with tactical nu
clear weapons and short and mediumrange missiles. And Rus
sia wants, in effect, a veto over troop deployments and exercises
in the eastern parts of nato territory and over military cooper
ation with all former Soviet countries.
Many of these demands are so extravagant and so detrimen
tal to Europe’s security that they may really be an ultimatum
drafted to be rejected, creating a pretext for another invasion of
Ukraine (see Briefing). If Mr Putin is indeed bent on going to war,
he will. However, robust diplomacy could yet
give him pause and help stop the long decay of
relations between Russia and the West. Even if
talks fail, nato could emerge stronger, more
united and clearer about the threat it faces.
Be in no doubt that Mr Putin has brought on
this crisis. Perhaps he wants Ukraine to fail be
cause, were it to become a thriving democracy,
it would stand as a rebuke to his claim that
Western values are unworkable in Orthodox, Slavic Russia. He
may also intend to divide and weaken nato as well as to create
an enemy abroad so as to justify repression at home—as with
Memorial, a civilrights group, shut down just before the new
year on the trumpedup charge of being a “foreign agent”. And
Mr Putin has come to regret the security arrangements that Rus
sia freely signed up to after the cold war. Today, he believes, Rus
sia is stronger and America is declining and distracted by the
challenge from China. For whatever reason, he seems in a hurry
to establish his legacy by renewing Russia’s sphere of influence.
Some things are in his favour. He has the aggressor’s advan
tage, controlling the timetable and the scope of an attack, should
there be one. Everyone knows that Ukraine matters more to him
than to any nato country, which means that the West will not
send troops to defend it.
But not everything is going his way. Ukraine is as populous as
Iraq. Although Russia’s forces should be able to defeat it in bat
tle, holding swathes of territory there could come at a high price,
especially if the Ukrainians mounted an insurgency. And in Kaz
akhstan, on Russia’s southern border, Mr Putin is being asked to
help crush a popular uprising—a distraction and awkward proof
of his willingness to oppress (see Asia section). For these rea
sons, he may have to curb his ambitions and, say, seize enclaves
aroundDonetskthatarealreadycontrolledbyRussianbacked
irregulars, or establish a land bridge to Crimea, which he an
nexed in 2014. His doubts about how far to go can be exploited.
Mr Putin’s other problem is that his aggression has united
natoand given it new purpose. His ultimatum, combined with
his willingness to see prices of Russian gas surge in Europe in
2021, has cut the ground from under those arguing for closer ties
to the Kremlin. America has helped galvanise Europeans, by
sharing detailed intelligence about huge numbers of troops
massing near the Ukrainian border.
The West should have two objectives in next week’s talks: to
deter war in Ukraine if possible, and to enhance European secur
ity. Stopping a Russian invasion involves the threat of severe
economic sanctions, as well as aid and defensive weapons to
help make Ukraine indigestible. At the same time, the West can
seek to reassure Mr Putin by clearly stating that, although Russia
has no formal veto over who joins nato, neither Ukraine nor
Georgia is about to become a member.
Done right, the second aim, of enhancing Europe’s security,
can also lower tensions over Ukraine. Although some Russian
demands would leave Europe vulnerable, others could be the ba
sis for talks that benefit both sides. Consider a regional agree
ment about the deployment of missile forces or confidence
building measures to make exercises less
threatening. There is no shortage of things to
discuss, from the Arctic to cybersecurity, to
new missile technologies. Negotiations would
be drawnout, such is the mistrust between the
two sides, but that might be no bad thing, be
cause they could turn into a useful forum.
The question is not whether such talks are
possible—they are clearly in Russia’s interest—
but whether Mr Putin really wants them. He has often behaved
as if Russia’s security depends on making the West feel less safe.
However, negotiations would enhance his status as a world lead
er. By circumscribing the domains of military competition, they
might also help him cope with the fact that Russia cannot begin
to match the combined resources of the West.
The profound doubts about Mr Putin’s real intentions mean
that, even if talks begin, nato needs to demonstrate that it is
prepared to defend its members. The most vulnerable are the
Baltic states. After Russia seized Crimea, nato’s western powers
started to rotate more troops in the east. Because of Russia’s
threats, credible preparations for enhancing those rotations
ought to begin immediately. Even if Ukraine is not about to join
nato, Russia is driving Sweden and Finland towards member
ship. The alliance should be ready to welcome them. Through
out, America should ensure that deals are never struck above
European countries’ heads: that is Russia’s style.
Mr Putin says that his country is threatened. It is not. nato is
a defensive alliance. Even after Crimea, it has held back from
putting permanent combat forces into eastern Europe. The real
threat is Mr Putin. When he issues his demands down the barrel
of a gun, it should stiffen the resolve bothoftheWest and of the
resilient Ukrainians to deter and resist him.nRussia’s aggression towards Ukraine has created a chance to enhance the security of Europe