she began sending back sensitive material
from the Prussian court, giving Victoria an
advantage over her ministers.
When war broke out between Denmark
and Prussia in 1864 over the disputed regions
of Schleswig and Holstein, Victoria used her
royal intelligence network to run rings
around her government. Palmerston intend-
ed to intervene in support of Denmark.
Victoria’s sympathies lay with the Germans
and, desperate to avoid war with Prussia, she
insisted that Palmerston tone down his
threats in defence of Denmark.
Vicky’s intelligence proved invaluable in
helping the queen rebuff calls for British
intervention. She sent bundles of sensitive
material on Prussian plans, the progress of
battles and weather conditions, and even
letters written by her husband’s aide-de-
camp. Attempting to undercut rival intelli-
gence channels, Vicky criticised information
Britain had gathered through the Foreign
Office. She told her mother that the ambassa-
dor in Berlin “understands nothing whatever
of German affairs”, was “continually misin-
formed” and used “bad sources”.
Victoria’s sources extended beyond her
immediate family. She also drew on intelli-
gence from Laurence Oliphant, a celebrated
mystic, author and traveller, who spent time
in Schleswig-Holstein and then with Vicky in
Prussia before reporting back to the queen in
person at Windsor Castle.
She even had her own spy inside the
cabinet. Lord Granville was a former foreign
secretary who became lord president of the
council, a role that brought him into regular
contact with the queen. He discreetly reported
individual ministers’ opinions back to the
palace without their knowledge.
Armed with the latest intelligence and
a mole in the cabinet, Victoria managed to
persuade the government not to intervene
militarily in support of Denmark. In October
1864, Denmark ceded Schleswig and Holstein
to Prussia and Austria.
Vicky’s intelligence became more alarm-
ing. She warned about the growing power
of Otto von Bismarck, minister-president of
Prussia. He manipulated the Prussian king
and, by 1866, intended to provoke a war with
Austria. The Foreign Office were completely
in the dark on the matter, underscoring the
importance of royal intelligence.
Indeed, Vicky’s intelligence proved to be
highly accurate, and so sensitive that she
started writing in a code to which even the
Foreign Office did not have access. Queen
Victoria also began to receive a flood of letters
from royal houses across Europe, warning
that war was becoming more likely. The duke
of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, for example,
boasted of “confidential and trustworthy”
Cover story / Queen of spies
contacts in Vienna and Berlin keeping him up
to date with “the most secret proceedings”.
These communications bypassed the
British government – much to the frustration
of the foreign secretary. Without telling minis-
ters, Victoria warned the Prussian king about
Bismarck ’s ambition and deception. “You are
deceived,” she wrote, continuing: “you are
made to believe that you are to be attacked,
and I your true friend and sister hear your
honoured name attacked and abused, for the
faults and reck lessness of others – or rather
more of one man.” She insisted the message
be hand delivered to evade Bismarck’s spies.
Victoria had assessed the incoming royal
intelligence astutely and, fearing war, pressed
for intervention. By contrast, diplomats in the
Foreign Office clung to the wishful assump-
tion that Germany was heading irreversibly
towards liberalism. They failed to properly
understand Bismarck, and insisted that war
would not break out.Against Victoria’s wishes, the cabinet
advocated strict neutrality. On this occasion,
Victoria was not able to persuade them to
change their minds. War broke out in June
1866; seven weeks later, it ended in Prussian
victory. Even so, Victoria continued to argue
against isolationism. She told the foreign
secretary that she would share “any private
intelligence which she may receive” – or
rather, in truth, she would share any intelli-
gence that backed up her stance.Playing the Great Game
Victoria was less well connected when it came
to Russia and the “Great Game” of empire.
When her second son, Alfred, married the
tsar’s daughter Maria Alexandrovna in 1874,
she hoped for similar inside information on
the Russian court. Unfortunately, their union
did not result in the same kind of intelligence
coup achieved by Vicky. For one thing, it was
a less-happy marriage, and the couple spent
little time in Russia. Alfred managed to
supply only the odd titbit from time to time.
Instead, Victoria took a close interest in
a different kind of spy: the traveller-cum-
adventurer-cum-soldier. One such was
Frederick Burnaby, who provided intelligence
from the imperial frontline. In the autumn of
1875 he travelled across Russia and central
Asia on horseback, evading the twin dangers
of Russian officers and frostbite.
On his return to Britain, Victoria sum-
moned him to Windsor to be regaled with
tales of his adventures and to hear his intelli-
gence on the Russian threat. The queen
listened avidly, agreeing vociferously with his
characterisation of Russia as duplicitous and
dangerous. In 1877, he sent more intelligenceIntelligence from
Victoria’s daughter
was so sensitive that
she started writing
in a code to which
even the Foreign Office
did not have access
Continental clash Austrian forces battle Danish troops at Königshügel on 3 Februar y 1864 during the
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