numbers from starving to death. [fn 14]
From the very beginning of this monumental genocide, Kissinger and Nixon made it clear that they
would not condemn Yahya Khan, whom Nixon considered a personal friend. Kissinger referred
merely to the "strong -arm tactics of the Pakistani military," and Nixon circulated a memo in his
own handwriting saying "To all hands. Don't squeeze Yahya at this time. RN" Nixon stressed
repeatedly that he wanted to "tilt" in favor of Pakistan in the crisis.
One level of explanation for this active complicity in genocide was that Kissinger and Nixon
regarded Yahya Khan as their indispensable back channel to Peking. But Kissinger could soon go to
Peking anytime he wanted, and soon he could talk to the Chinese UN delegate in one of the CIA's
New York safe houses. The essence of the support for the butcher Yahya Khan was this: in 1962India and China had engaged in a brief border war, and the Peking leaders regarded India as their (^)
geopolitical enemy. In order to ingratiate himself with Chou and Mao, Kissinger wanted to take a
position in favor of Pakistan, and therefore of Pakistan's ally China, and against India and against
India's ally, the USSR. (Shortly after Kissinger's trip to China had taken place and Nixon had
announced his intention to go to Peking, Inditreaty. a and the USSR had signed a twenty year friendship
In Kissinger's view, the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Bengal was sure to become a Sino-Soviet clash
by proxy, and he wanted the United States aligned with China in order to impress Peking with the
vast benefits to be derived from the US-PRC strategic alliance under the heading of the "Chinacard."
Kissinger and Nixon were isolated within the Washington bureaucracy on this issue. Secretary of
State Rogers was very reluctant to go on supporting Pakistan, and this was the prevalent view in
Foggy Botfrom the vast majority of Congretom and in the embassies around the world. Tricky Dick and Fat Henry were isolatedssional opinion, which expressed horror and outrage over the
extent of the carnage being carried out week after week, month after month, by Yahya Khan's
armed forces. Even the media and US public opinion could not find any reason for the friendly "tilt"
in favor of Yahya Khan. On July 31, Kissinger exploded at a meeting of the Senior Review Group
when a proposal was made that the Pakistani army could be removed from Bengal. "Why is it ourbusiness how they govern themselves," Kissinger raged. "The President always says to tilt to
Pakistan, but every proposal I get [from inside the US government] is in the opposite direction.
Sometimes I think I am in a nut house." This went on for months. On December 3, at a meeting of
Kissinger's Washington Special Action Group, Kissinger exploded again, exclaiming "I've been
catching unshirted hell every half-hour fromreally doesn't believe we're carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt towards Pakistan and he the president who says we're not tough enough. H e
believes that every briefing or statement is going the other way." [fn 15]
But no matter what Rogers, the State Department and the rest of the washington bureaucracy might
do, Kissinger knew that George Bush at the UN would play along with the pro-Pakistan tilt. "And Iknew that George Bush, our able UN ambassador, would carry out the President's policy," wrote
Kissinger in his memoirs in describing his decision to drop US opposition to a Security Council
debate on the subcontinent. This made Bush one of the most degraded and servile US officials of
the era.
Indira Gandhi had come to Washington in November to attempt a peaceful settlement to the crisis,
but was crudely snubbed by Nixon and Kissinger. The chronology of the acute final phase of the
crisis can be summed up as follows:
December 3-- Yahya Khan ordered the Pakistani Air Force to carry out a series of surprise air raids