position." Bush asked for the opportunity to reply, saying that he would make it "brief and strong."
He began citing James Schlesinger serving a few months at the CIA before going on to thePentagon, a lamentable comparison all around. With Bush red-faced and whining, knowing that the (^)
day was going very badly indeed, Stennis tried to put him out of his misery by ending the session.
But even this was not vouchsafed to poor, tormented George. He still had to endure Senator Leahy
explaining why he, too, would vote against the Bush nomination.
Bush whined in reply "Senator, I know you have arrived at your conclusion honestly and I would
only say I think it is unfortunate that you can say I have the character and I have the integrity, the
perception, but that the way it is looked at by somebody else overrides that." A candidate for the
CIA was in mortal peril, but a public wimp was born.
Bush had been savaged in the hearings, and his nomination was now in grave danger of being
rejected by the committee, and then by the full Senate. Later in the afternoon of November 16, a
damage control party met at the White House to assess the situation for Ford. [fn 18] According to
Patrick O'Donnell of Ford's Congressional Relations Office, the most Bush could hope for was a
bare majority of 9 outRepublicans, plus Stennis, Harry Byrd of V of 16 votes on the Stennis committee. This represented the committeeirginia, and Stuart Symington. But that was paper thin, (^)
thought O'Donnell: "This gives is a bare majority and will, of course, lead to an active floor fight
which will bring the rank and file Democrats together in a vote which will embarrass the President
and badly tarnish, if not destroy, one of his brightest stars." O'Donnell was much concerned that
Jackson had "called for the President to pulicly remove George Bush from the vice presidentialrace." Senator Cannon had not attended the hearings, and was hard to judge. Senator McIntyre
obviously had serious reservations, and Culver, Leahy, and Gary Hart were all sure to vote no. A
possible additional Democratic vote for Bush was that of Sam Nunn of Georgia, whom O'Donnell
described as "also very hesitant but strongly respects George and has stated that a favorable vote
would only be because of the personal relationship." O'Donnell urge Ford to call both Cannon andNunn.
LBJ had observed that Ford was so dull that he was incapable of walking and chewing gum at the
same time. But now even Ford knew he was facing the shipwreck of one of his most politically
sensitive nominations, important in his efforts to dissociate himself from the intelligencecommunity mayhem of the recent past.
Ford was inclined to give the senators what they wanted, and exclude Bush a priori from the vice
presidential contest. When Ford called George over to the Oval Office on December 18, he already
had the text of a letter to Stennis announcing that Bush was summarily ruled off the ticket if Fordwere the candidate (which was anything but certain). Ford showed Bush the letter. We do not know (^)
what whining may have been heard in the White House that day from a senatorial patrician deprived
(for the moment) of his birthright. Ford could not yield; it would have thrown his entire election
campaign into acute embarrassment just as he was trying to get it off the ground under the likes of
Bo Callaway. When George saw that Ford was obdurate, he proposed that the letter be amended tomake it look as if the initiative to rule him out as a running mate had originated with Bush. The
fateful letter:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As we both know, the nation must have a strong and effective foreign intelligence capability. Justover two weeks ago, on December 7 while in Pearl Habor, I said that we must never drop our gua (^) rd
nor unilaterally dismantle our defenses. The Central Intelligence Agency is essential to maintaining
our national security.
I nominated Ambassador George Bush to be CIA Director so we can now get on with appropriate