memorandum for The Honorable George P. Shultz, on a White House letterhead but bearing no
signature, saying no to Shultz: The institutional arrangements established in NSDD-2 are, Ibelieve, appropriate to fulfill [our national security requirements in Central America]....'' With the (^) put-down is a chart headlinedNSDD-2 Structure for Central America.'' At the top is the President;
just below is a complex of Bush's SSG and CPPG as managers of the NSC; then below that is the
Secretary of State, and below him various agencies and interagency groups.@s9
July 12, 1983:Kenneth De Graffenreid, new manager of the Intelligence Directorate of the National Security (^)
Council, sent a secret memo to George Bush's aide, Admiral Daniel Murphy:
... Bud McFarlane has asked that I meet with you today, if possible, to review procedures for obtaining the Vice President's comments and concurrence on all N[ational] S[ecurity] C[ouncil] P[lanning G[roup] cThe Bush Regency in Actionovert action and MONs. ''@s1@s0 October 20, 1983: The U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island-nation of Grenada was decided upon in a secret meeting of the metagovernment--the National Security State--under the leadership of George Bush. National Security Councaction for posterity: il operative Constantine Menges, a stalwart participant in these events, described the My job that afternoon was to write the background memorandum that would be used by the vice president, who in his role ascrisis manager'' would chair this first NSC meeting on the [Grenada]
issue.... [F]ortunately I had help from Oliver North, who in his nearly three years with NSC had
become expert in the memo formats and formNorth had begun to get interested in Grenada.... Shortly before 6:00 P.M., the participants began toal procedures. After the morning CPPG meeting, (^)
arrive: Vice President Bush, [Secretary of Defense Caspar] Weinberger, [Attorney General Edwin]
Meese, J[oint] C[hiefs of] S[taff] Chairman General Vessey, acting CIA Director McMahon, [State
Dept. officer Lawrence] Eagleburger, ... North and myself. We all went to the Situation Room in
the White House. President Reagan was travelling, as were [CIA Director] Bill Casey and JeaneKirkpatrick.... Vice President Bush sat in the president's chair.
Menges continued: ... A factual update was the first order of business. Then the discussion moved to the availability of military forces and how long it would take to ready them. The objective, right from the beginning, was to plan a rescue [of American students detained on Grenada] that wouldguarantee quick success, but with a minimum of casualties....''The first suggested presidential
decision was to prepare for possible military action by shifting navy ships, which were taking a
marine unit to rotate forces in Lebanon, plus other naval units, toward Grenada. Secrecy was imperative.... As part of this plan, there would be no change in the schedule of the top man. President Reagan ... would travel to Augusta, Georgia, for a golf weekend. Secretary of State Shultzwould go too....'' Work now proceeded on detailed action plans, under the guidance of the Vice President's Special Situation Group.Late Friday afternoon [Oct. 21] ... the CPPG ... [met] in room
208.... Now the tone of our discussions had shifted from whether we would act to how this could be
accomplished.... ''[The] most secure means [were to] be used to order U.S. ships to change course ...
toward Grenada. Nevertheless, ABC news had learned about this and was broadcasting it.''
Thus, the course of action decided upon without the President was ``leaked'' to the news media, and
became a fait-accompli. Menges's memo continues:
It pleased me to see that now our government was working as a team.... That evening Ollie North
and I worked together ... writing the background a[NSC officer Admiral John] Poindexter reviewed our first draft and made a few minor revisions.nd decision memoranda. Early in the evening (^)
Then the Grenada memoranda were sent to the President, Shultz and McFarlane at the golf course
in Georgia.... Shortly before 9:00 A.M. [Oct. 22], members of the foreign policy cabinet [sic!]
began arriving at the White House--all out of sight of reporters. The participants included
Weinberger, Vessey, and Fred Ikle from Defense; Eagleburger and Motley from State; McMahon