Major Moises Giroldi attempted to oust General Noriega and seize power. The pro-golpe forces
appear to have had Noriega in their physical control for a certain period of time, and they were incontact with the US Southern Command in Panama City through various channels. But they neither (^)
executed Noriega nor turned him over to the US forces, and Noriega used the delay to rally the
support of loyal troops in other parts of Panama. The US forces mobilized, and blocked two roads
leading towards the PDF headquarters, just as they golpe leaders had requested. But the golpistas
also wanted US combat air support and would have required US ground forcassistance. Bush stalled on these requests, and the golpe collapsed before Bush could make up hises to provide active (^)
mind what to do.
Bush's crisis management style was portrayed as an autocratic one-man show, with Bush refusing to
convoke the usual "excomm"-style crisis committee with representatives from State, Defense, NSA,CIA, and other interested bureaucratic parties. Instead, Bush reportedly insisted on being furnished
with three parallel streams of reports from State, Defense, and CIA. While he was puzzling over the
conflicting evaluations, his coup team was being rounded up and liquidated. It was worse than his
blundering management of the Sudan coup in 1985.
There are signs that the wide criticism of his botched handling of the coup, including from such
close allies as Skull and Bones Senator David Boren of Oklahoma, was an excruciating personal
humiliation for Bush. As the feared former boss of Langley, he was supposedly a past master in
subversion, putsches, and the toppling of governments disobedient to Washington. His foreign
policy credentials, touted as the strong suit in his resume, were now fatally tarnished. According tosome alleged insider accounts, US forces had not rushed to the aid of the rebels because of
reluctance and mistrust on the part of US officers, starting with Gen. Thurman, the US commander
in Panama.
Congressman Dave McCurdy of Olike a man of resolve. There's a resurgence of the wimp factor." George Will wrote a columnklahoma criticized Bush: "Yesterday makes Jimmy Carter look
entitled "An Unserious Presidency."
Bush hid from the press for 11 days after the golpe was crushed, but then had to face a barrage of
hostile questions anyway. Since he had urged the overthrow of Noriega, he was asked, was itconsistent not to back the rebels with US armed forces? Bush replied:
Yes, absolutely consistent. I want to see him [Noriega] out of there and I want to see him brought to
justice. And that should not imply that that automatically means, no matter what the plan is, or no
matter what the coup attempt is, diplomatically and anything else, that we give carte blanche
support to that.
I think this rather sophisticated argument that if you say you'd like to see Noriega out, that implies a
blanket, open carte blanche on the use of American military force...to me that's a stupid argument
that some very erudite people make.
Bush was very sarcastic about "instant hawks appearing from where there used to be feathers of a
dove." There had been reports of severe temper tantrums by Bush as critical accounts of his crisis
leadership had been leaked from inside his own administration. But Bush denied that he had been
chewing the carpet: "I never felt, you know, anger or blowing up. It's absurd," Bush stated
disingenuously. "I didn't get angry. I diblame coming out of the Oval Office or attributed to the Oval Office in the face of criticism. I'm notdn't get angry. What I did say is, I don't want to see any (^)
in the blame business. Blame, if there's some to be assigned, it comes in there. And that's where it
belongs." Bush stressed that he was ready to use force to oust Noriega: "I wouldn't mind using force
now if it could be done in a prudent manner. We want to see Mr. Noriega out." The mortified
former CIA director also defended the quality of his intelligence: "There has not been an