The Nature of Political Theory

90 The Nature of Political Theory

metaphysics, but the basic enmity has remained an undercurrent, even to the present
day (see Strawson 1974; also Walsh 1966: 194–5).
One of the most oft-cited expositors of this period on political theory is T. D. Wel-
don, particularlyhisbookThe Vocabulary of Politicsandhisarticle‘PoliticalPrinciples’
(seeWeldon1953, 1956). Weldonoffersanidiosyncratictoothyself-confidentblendof
logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy.^10 There is both the observation
of meaning in use and the demand to tidy up language and dismiss certain uses.
For Weldon the whole of normative political philosophy rests on a mistake. It
is a mistake about language. Mistakes, as Weldon notes, arise from ‘carelessness
over the implication of language...from the primitive and generally unquestioned
belief that words, and especially the words which normally occur in discussion about
politics...have intrinsic and essential meanings which it is the aim of political philo-
sophers to elucidate’. The search for ‘word essences’ is ‘a wild goose chase’ (Weldon
1953: 11–12, 28). Words can be relatively stable in a society over time, but that
is simply because the objects and situations confronted remain stable. But there is
nothing behind or beyond institutions which they express or realize. There is no
essential justice or rights. Words do not have essences to Weldon, they have uses, qua
Austin and Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, many of the great political thinkers of the
past had been searching, in vain, for stable essences. Echoing the mantra that philo-
sophy does not offer any first order knowledge, Weldon remarked that ‘it is not the
job of philosophy to provide new information about politics...or any other matters
of fact. Philosophical problems are entirely second order problems. They are prob-
lems, that is, which are generated by the language in which facts are described and
explained by those whose function it is to construct and defend scientific, historical,
or other types of theory’ (Weldon 1953: 22). In this conclusion, we have the undiluted
ordinary language stress.
However, there is also logical positivist side to Weldon. He assures his readers that
generations of intelligent political philosophers were performing some kind of role,
although it remains obscure. It appears to be a combination of empirical description
and the recommendation of reasonably obvious prejudices, which have no cognit-
ive status. Personal prejudices though do not have to be dishonest or misplaced.
Weldon admits that his own prejudices are basically those of J. S. Mill (Weldon 1953:
16). However, there are no ultimately reasonable foundations to be discovered. He
continues, that the bulk of political philosophy does look, in these circumstances,
delusional (Weldon 1953: 177). This is particularly the case with normative argu-
ment. Such arguments are neither logical nor empirical. Conversely, they evince
strong emotions and only tell us about the psychological states of individual theor-
ists, not about the world. This is the classic doctrine of emotivism. In this sense, the
large bulk of normative political theory and political ideology moves directly into
the obfuscatory realm of subjective laudatory ‘hurrahs’ and emotive ejaculations.^11
As Weldon notes, unequivocally, normative political theory has ‘formulated ques-
tions of a type to which no empirically testable answers could be given, and such
questions are nonsensical’ (Weldon 1953: 14–15). There are no verifiable aspects to
democracy, rights, or justice. Without a hint of hubris, he articulates the main thesis