92 The Nature of Political Theory(of which Weldon was also a part) did not really advance the case much beyond
commenting, on a second order level, that moral and political discourse does actually
exist, although it was not the function of political philosophers to recommend it.
The sense of the mortification was more widespread though, and not all blamed
it on logical positivism. Whereas Laslett thought the corpse fairly fresh, Leo Strauss,
smelt advanced putrefaction in a late 1950s jeremiad. The death of political theory,
in fact, had been a protracted one, over the three waves of modernity (discussed in
Part One). Yet, political philosophy had given up the ghost well before the twentieth
century. The last rites had however been said by modernism in the twentieth century.
Political philosophy had become fatally divorced from political science. For Strauss
‘science’ was now seen as the highest form of knowledge—an idea also later pursued
by Habermas and Gadamer. In this sense, for Strauss, it is hardly surprising that
‘political philosophy is in a state of decay and perhaps putrefaction, if it has not van-
ished altogether’ (Strauss 1959: 17). The only function that political philosophy now
performs is as an adjunct to political science. It is a kind of antiquated performing
bear, which lumbers its way through well-worn routines under the guise of the his-
tory of political theory. For Strauss all this putrefaction figures against the dramatic
backdrop of the cosmic clash between the ancients and moderns. Thus, the cause of
death was a compound of the rise of modernism, the hegemony of natural science
positivism, the splitting of disciplines like political science from political philosophy,
and the nihilistic scepticism over the role of values in human life. For Strauss, many
other elements have already left the political philosophy fold—economics, sociology,
and psychology. Political philosophy had even muttered a soulfulet tu Bruteto history
(although whether Strauss would have been happy with the renewed partnership in
the last few decades of the century remains an open question).
The modern behavioural movement, which Strauss bewailed, also predicted the
death of the older political theory. However they considered this positively. Many
were clear that political theory had in future to be more empirically rigorous in
order to survive. David Easton thus saw traditional political theorists as academic
parasites. The cause of the decline of political theory in this scenario, has more
indirectlinkswithlogicalpositivism. Infact, asGunnellnotes, ‘Oneoftheironies...is
the behaviouralists, in distancing themselves [from political theory]...and in their
search for an articulate and defensible notion of science and theoretical identity,
ultimately attached themselves to another body of [European] émigré literature—the
philosophy of logical positivism and empiricism’ (Gunnell 1993b: 7). In this same
period, another cognate movement also clearly gave succour to the ‘death thesis’,
namely, the ‘end of ideology’ (as discussed in Part One). The ‘end of ideology’ was,
again, a temporary phase, although it is worth noting that the ‘underlying premises’ of
the movement would still be upheld today by many who regard themselves as genuine
political scientists.
One might think that the ‘death of political theory’ idea would have passed gently
into the collective unconscious of the political studies, however theorists well into the
1990s have still gone on feeling the impulsion to reflect upon it. Brian Barry in the
retrospective introduction to the second edition of his well-knownPolitical Argument