Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred 95some of the cultural excuses that make us smile at his eccentricity. Second, the thinking
that gave rise to the debate about the death of theory, is largely rooted in forms of
analytic philosophy and social science-based positivism. This form of thinking is still
present in the political theory discipline. Thus, the roots of this kind of judgement
are all still very much intact, if partly submerged.
It is clear though that certainly by the 1960s a number of theorists, within the gen-
eric analytic-based ordinary language domain, felt that something had gone wrong.
As Condren comments, ‘despite earlier rumours of death, political theory is a mod-
ish activity heavily populated at its centre by a relatively unreflexive corpus, a rump
which is apparently happy to wriggle from one set of priorities to another’ (Condren
1985: 37). There were though a number of articles, which encouraged the wriggle and
indicated that political theory might, after all, have a role. One of the most often cited
of these is Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’ The basic argument is,
though, hardly startling, except in the historical context in which it was written. The
gist of the piece is that in addition to the standard logical positivist fare of analytic
and empirical propositions there is a third type, which, of course, had been relegated
to the sphere of emotion or nonsense by logical positivism. This third sphere should
however be recovered as uniquely meaningful in its own right. It involves normative or
genuinely practical philosophical questions. Thus, when we speak about concepts like
the state, liberty, or authority we are examining what is ‘normative’ in such notions.
Further, there is usually little agreement on the meaning of such concepts. However
this is not unexpected or necessarily worrying. These questions invoke human self-
interpretations and self-conceptions. As Berlin comments ‘men’s beliefs in a sphere
of conduct are part of their conception of themselves and others as human beings’
(Berlin 1962: 13). We are, as Charles Taylor has often reminded us, self-interpreting
creatures. We need to examine the ‘manner’ and ‘form’ in which we seek to consti-
tute ourselves. Thus, against the earlier dismissal of normative propositions, Berlin
comments ‘to suppose...that there have been or could be ages without political
philosophy, is like supposing that as there are ages of faith, so there could be ages of
total disbelief’ (Berlin 1962: 17). Normative issues thus lurch into view again in the
later 1960s, this time with a hesitant analytic benediction.
Wittgenstein and Essential Contestability
The recovery of interest in normative argument within the analytic style is due to a
complexity of factors, which can only be glossed briefly. First, the social and political
circumstances of the 1960s and early 1970s were requisite for this development. This
was a period which saw an upsurge of counter-culture movements, wide scale social
radicalism, a tremendous swelling of concern for civil rights legislation, on issues
of race, sexuality, gender, poverty, and reproductive rights. Much of the legislation,
which allowed greater freedoms and rights over issues such as abortion, homosexual-
ity, educational rights, and so forth, was initiated in this period. Further, for a whole
generation of young Americans and Australians (and many others across the world)