Foundations Shaken but Not Stirred 97rules of usage. At one point, Wittgenstein refers to these rules as equivalent to a kind
of grammar, not a surface grammar, but rather a deep grammar, which embodies the
variety of possible uses of a word. These rules (or depth grammar) are embedded in
what he refers to as ‘language games’ or ‘forms of life’. Language games are simply
ways of operating in the world. There must be shared rules, conventions, and language
games for there to be any common or shared meanings. However language games
are prodigiously diverse and cannot be reduced to other language games. There is
no master form of life. As one writer comments, ‘meaning is determined by the
word’s “distribution” in language, the “linguistic environment” in which it occurs’
(Pitkin 1972: 11). The same concept will often come under different language games.
Wittgenstein is insistent here that there is no essence to words. However, the different
uses of the word may well have what he calls ‘family resemblances’. A word like
game, for example, may have a number of uses—from Olympic games to board
games—however Wittgenstein insists that we should not just assert that ‘There must
be something common, or they would not be called “games”—but look and see
whether there is anything common at all.’ Wittgenstein contends that if you look
‘you will not see something that is common at all, but similarities, relationships’
(Wittgenstein 1951: section 66).
We often take language games for granted. They are not hidden, but they can be
overlooked, partly because they are so familiar. Yet to grasp any language game or
form of life is always equivalent to mastering the rules of a game and its complex
techniques. To know the techniques and rules of a game is to be able to perform the
requisite actions. All human action, for Wittgenstein, is, in fact, linked directly to
language. To follow a rule is distinct from habit or behaviour. Onemustintend to
follow rules. Thus rule-following, is by definition, purposive or intentional. Meaning,
asembodiedinrules, isthusintrinsicallytiedtointentionalactivity. Thus, discourseor
language is tied intimately to action. This is the root to Austin and Searle’s conception
of ‘speech acts’—although both the latter thinkers produce a much more differentia-
ted and complex analysis of types of action. Words are forms of action. When we
mean something it arises from the rules and intentions embedded in forms of life or
language games. Language is viewed as integral to all our actions in the world. Thus,
in Wittgenstein, there is not only a sophisticated epistemology and philosophy of
mind, but also a philosophy of action intimately tied to the philosophy of mind. Both
are rooted in a linguistic conventionalism. This also forms the root to Peter Winch’s
well-known study,The Idea of Social Science, and the basis for his central distinctions
between natural and social science (Winch 1958).
In this sense, the role of philosophy—parallel to other ordinary language
philosophers—is largely analytical and descriptive. It might be described (as men-
tioned above) either as a linguistic idealism, or, alternatively, as a linguistic
phenomenology. It does notsolve philosophical problems, as such; conversely,
through a careful attention to the way words are used, it candissolvephilosophical
problems. As Weldon argued, many difficulties arise with concepts since the speaker
will often try to fix upon one particular use as some kind of essence. In this context,
Wittgensteinian analysis issues clear reminders to speakers. Some philosophers will