122 The Nature of Political Theoryinterest-based utilitarian theories are sceptical of preference readings, nonetheless, all
such positions conceptually overlap. Welfare or interests assume, in the final analysis,
that agents would prefer, or gain some pleasure from, such policies. Thus, many of
the problems that dog hedonic accounts still lie just below the surface of welfarist or
preference utilitarianisms.
Utilitarians, when considering utility, have also differed on the pertinent object
for any utility calculus. This raises the additional crucial distinction between act and
rule utilitarianism. Rule utilitarianism suggests that we should calculate according to
specific rules or norms to ascertain the greatest utility. Act utilitarianism suggests that
we should focus on which action produces the greatest utility. It is therefore the act
itself, not the following of a rule, which is crucial. In point, act utilitarians usually see
the following of a rule as likely to undermine maximum utility in certain situations.
Act maximization is seen as more flexible for policy making. However, the range of
possible actions (qua act utility) could be enormous. If there were no rules on which to
base calculation, then act utilitarianism could well be impossible to practise, for even
the most assiduous policy-maker. In this sense, for some, rule-based utility calculus
(even if cruder) is far easier to work with and inculcate in a bureaucratic domain.
It is also worth noting here that there has been a definite subtle shift in utilitarian
concerns from an initial focus on utility, as a way of discussingpersonalmoral conduct
(in the early to mid-twentieth century), towards a concern (in the late twentieth
century) with utility as a more public philosophy, namely, as a way of collectively
managing or reforming public policy.^15 Many current utilitarians, although prepared
to admit that utility is intuitively striking on the level of personal morality, still
see it as much more defensible on the public level, as a form of government house
utilitarianism (see Goodin 1995, 1997).
Many critics of utilitarianism have argued that utility, nonetheless, ignores the
complexity and communal rootedness of human agents. Utility criteria try to evade
any contexts for ethics or politics, and tend to speak with an impersonal, universal,
neutral, and calculating voice. In this sense, utilitarianism shares some of the early
Rawlsian and neo-Kantian need to be universally foundational, neutral, and separate
from historical or communal concerns. For critics, however, this instrumentally
rational way of viewing values is worlds apart from what happens in most moral
or political situations. However, current utilitarians, who feel philosophically queasy
about its rigorous application to personal morality, are, nonetheless, fairly certain that
utility calculation is probably necessary and quite desirable in areas such as public
policy and economic decision-making. Interpersonal utility calculation is seen to be
quite feasible in this latter domain. In fact, some would argue that it is the basis
for all sensible public policy-making. The criticism often made against utility—at
this point, usually by neo-Kantians that it undermines the separateness of persons—
can in fact, be partly met by the contention that public policydoesactually aim to
aggregate persons’ concerns. In the process of policy aggregation, many aspects of
the ‘distinctiveness of persons’ will inevitably drop out. However, that by definition,
almost always has to happen for any policy objective to be achieved. Yet each person’s
interests will, ideally, still have been considered equally. In this sense, utilitarianism