Bleached Foundations 125the interests of agents. Justice, for Rawls, should not reflect or reinforce arbitrary
chance or interests, but rather should aim to nullify them for the sake of basic fairness
(Rawls 1971: 101–2).
The device by which this nullification is achieved inThe Theory of Justiceis the
‘original position’. This allows individuals to choose principles for the organization
of justice in society behind a ‘veil of ignorance’—a form of rational disinterestedness
equivalent, in function, to the old idea of the social contract and state of nature.
As Rawls notes, ‘My aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and
carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as
found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. In order to do this we are not to think of
the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form
of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic
structure of society are the object of the original agreement’ (Rawls 1971: 11). This
view directly echoes Kant who remarked that ‘The original contract is not a principle
explaining the origin of society; rather it is a principle explaining how it ought to
be...It is not the principle establishing the state; rather it is the principle of political
government and contains the ideal of legislation, administration, and public legal
justice’ (quoted in introduction to Kant 1965: xxx). Rawls has, in his first book, a
strong belief in underlying rules or norms of rationality. There are parallels here with
depth grammar and the Wittgensteinian essential contestability argument. We use
language, but do not often consider the grammar that underpins it. Analogously with
rational, moral, and political thought, we function morally but do not think about
the underlying grammar of rules and assumptions of ethics. These norms and rules,
Rawls suggests, can be teased out by rational inquiry.^16 Careful analysis can reveal
this deep structure of rules.
How is it possible to show these basic deep rules? One needs a procedure to reveal
them, which remains impartial and neutral, namely, an agreed procedure. The basic
question underlying this agreed procedure is, what principles of justice would rational
individuals choose in a situation of agreed equality? Or, to put it another way, how
ought society to be organized if it is to conform to principles chosen by rational
individuals—uninfluenced by knowledge of their vested interests, social situation,
natural endowments, life plans, or how such principles would affect them personally.
The veil of ignorance allows this ‘teasing out’ process to take place. This ‘veil’ device
conceals personal or particular abilities and powers from choosers, but allows general
information, provided by the social scientific disciplines. The individual is considered
in an asocial and ahistorical setting, but is nonetheless rational and has knowledge of
societies and history. This is essentially a hypothetical thought experiment to Rawls.
To try and gain some degree of fairness and neutrality, it is abstracted from personal
interest.
In this original position, the individual is assumed (and this is apparently shown
by the various disciplines) to be a self-interested rational chooser, with definite con-
ceptions of a plan of life, who will try to minimize losses and maximize benefits in any
choice situation. Humans are also depoliticized. Benevolence and altruism are ruled
out. Further, each individual is assumed to desire certain primary goods, that is, social