The capacity for controlling one’s life through such purposes, in this argument, is
‘character’. See Vincent and Plant (1984: ch. 6).
James Buchanan adopts a similar view. He sees his approach as individualistic in, what
he calls, ‘an ontological-methodological sense’. In this sense, ‘Each man counts for one,
and that is that’. What any such individualistic society needs to establish for Buchanan is
therefore ‘orderly anarchy’ (see Buchanan 1975, 1 and 4).
The concentration on collective choice, welfare, and preferences again shows the close links
with current rational choice argument.
As Rawls comments: ‘A correct account of moral capacities will...involve principles and
theoretical constructions which go much beyond the norms and standards cited in every-
day life’, Rawls (1971: 47).
Gauthier has pointed out here that Rawls is therefore quite clearly not a rational choice
theorist—something that Rawls in his later work has reinforced.
Rawls’ later work will be examined in Part Three.
See also Okin (1979, 1981, and 1987). Martha Nussbaum has also developed her own
comparative analysis of social justice, by what she calls the ‘capabalities approach’. The
capabilities in question are considered as universal, see Nussbaum and Glover (eds.) 1995.
Nussbaum’s more general perspective is discussed in Part Three, Chapter Six. In terms
of other forms of extension of Rawlsian argument (which I do not have the space to
develop), there have been a number of attempts to extend the whole debate on justice into
an international setting by Charles Beitz, amongst others, see for example, Beitz (1979).
One problem is that many feminists have associated the market qualities of competition,
individualism, and self-interest with masculinity.
Ruddick and Elshtain particularly think that ‘maternal thinkers who make responsibility to
children and families their central commitment could radically reform public values, could
even create an “ethical polity” devoted to a politics of compassion’, see Boling (1991: 608).
Spheres could look like language games or forms of life.
Walzer spheres are much more constrained and finite by comparison with Wittgenstein’s
language games.
David Miller has adapted Walzer’s thesis to his own pluralistic account of social justice.
Instead of premising it on spheres and social goods, he speaks of ‘modes of human
relationships’ (Miller 1999: 25ff.). He suggests that human beings stand in many and
different types of particular relationships to each other and we need to focus on these to
make sense of justice. Despite the complexity of these particulars, he isolates three basic
modes—solidaristic community, instrumental association, and citizenship. He takes his
task to examine ‘the underlying principles of justice that spring directly from the various
modes of relationships’ (Miller 1999: 26). Each mode calls forth different or contrast-
ing principles of justice and needs to be contextualized. This notion enables individuals
to see where at times they might be crossing modes and thus misunderstanding their
relationships.
We cannot totally step back to assess communities, morality, or justice with a view from
nowhere, althoughwecancriticizethemfromwithinusinginternalstandardsofrationality.
As Brian Barry comments ‘justice has certain formal characteristics...[and he adds that]
the universal validity of this proposition cannot be challenged by showing that a lot of
people in some benighted society think otherwise.’ (Barry in Miller and Walzer (eds.)
1995: 7).
