The Nature of Political Theory

150 The Nature of Political Theory

Tradition, in this latter work, is not something to be taught or put across either
in injunctive rationalist texts or moral or political manuals. Practical knowledge is
distinct from technical knowledge. Moral and political practices are rooted in a tra-
ditional manner of doing things. However, tradition is not a static body of rules. It
is, conversely, a contingent, moving and multi-voiced creature—a mixture of con-
ventional aversions, preferences, anxieties, and fears. It consequently provides no
unambiguous norms or rules. It has no fixed point or purpose. It therefore cannot
be summarized in a firm doctrine. It is diffused between past, present, and future.
Consequently, it is a ‘tricky thing to get to know’. As Oakeshott remarks, ‘Although it
moves, it is steady, it is tranquil though never at rest.’ He thus describes it as a ‘flow of
sympathy’. Knowing what to do next, for a traditionalist, is a matter of intimations,
not rational rules. The demeanour of the traditionalist has some parallels with the
philosophical demeanour outlined in his early work (Oakeshott 1962: 128).
The question arises here as to what bearing does the above analysis of conventional
usage have on Oakeshott’s conception of political association? There are two possible
conventionalist responses here. One argues that all theory can do is observe what
‘is’ the case in any community—that is, painting its grey upon grey. This conven-
tionalism allows no normative or positive interjections. The second response is more
nuanced and has a number of possible subtle variants, some of which will be explored
in later sections of this chapter. In Oakeshott’s case, he uses the theme of ‘ideal
character’ to suggest that there are, in fact, forms of association. Ideal characters are
neither universal, nor do they bear any precise relation to specific historical examples.
Thus, although they are conventional and are generated from within the idioms of a
particular European ‘civilization’, nonetheless they do possess a form of partial tran-
scendence. Oakeshott appears to be offering here a form of realistic phenomenology
of associations. Political or civil relationships are one amongst many types of human
relationship. Oakeshott suggests, inOn Human Conduct, that there are two forms
of association—which he callscivilandenterpriseassociations—understood as ideal
characters. Humans, reflectively, utilize these ideal characters to both enact and dis-
close themselves. Any such articulations are, again, not to be seen as deterministic or
mechanistic. It is the agent that utilizes them in the understanding, conforming to
thepersonaeof each form of association (see Oakeshott 1975: 112).
Enterpriseassociations involve ‘joint pursuit of some imagined and wished-for
satisfaction’. Relationships are conducted ‘in terms of the pursuit of some com-
mon purpose, some substantive condition of things to be jointly procured, or some
common interests to be continuously satisfied’ (Oakeshott 1975: 113 and 114). The
association exists in terms of the common pursuit of a substantive purpose, willed by
the membership.Civilassociation (which Oakeshott considers preferable) is a rela-
tionship ‘in respect of common recognition of considerations such as uses or rules
intelligently subscribed to in self-chosen performances’. This is a formal, not a sub-
stantial relationship, ‘that is, association in respect of a common language and not in
respect of having the same beliefs, purposes, interests, etc., in making the same utter-
ances’. Citizens (cives), in civil association, are not partners in a common enterprise,
since there isnocommon purpose (Oakeshott 1975: 121 and 122). Civil association,