Shoring Up Foundations 161which, in turn, was both a uniquely personalandcultural phenomenon. Herder
is thus often linked to the origins of both nationalist and communitarian thought.
It follows that denying recognition to cultures is also oppression of identity. One
difficulty with this theme (which will not be dealt with here) is that it gives rise to
the conception of community or group rights, which stand in a complex and tense
relation with individual rights.
Fifth, there is a strong thesis concerning the ethics of communitarianism. It advoc-
ates a conventionalist ethics, which is counterposed to ethical universalism. Thus,
communitarians argue that political and moral goods cannot be determined by
abstract reasoning. Moral and political goods arise from within particular histor-
ical communities. There are no absolute external rational or neutral foundations for
ethics or the good life. There is no theory that stands apart from a social context.
In this scenario, the notion of neutrality (often dear to procedural liberals) looks
suspect. Communities tend to favour their own values and try to promote them. It is
thus well nigh impossible, in this context, to foster a neutral conception of the good.
Most commmunitarians would add to this the point that a procedural liberal society
unwittingly promotes certain conceptions of the good.
For communitarianism, morality is neither invented nor discovered, but inter-
preted as already existent. Again, this directly parallels Oakeshott’s analysis. Michael
Walzer comments, therefore, that ‘what we do when we argue is to give an account
of the actual existing morality’ (Walzer 1987: 21). As connected critics we read off an
existing tradition of discourse. The community becomes the locus of the good and
source of values. Notions of the good are already embodied in ‘forms of life’ or ‘ideal
characters’. These form the basis to practical reasoning and political judgement. We
do not need external theoretical foundations for a practical life, rather we draw upon
the interpretations of a tradition or form of life. For Walzer, therefore, ‘We cannot
totally step back to assess communities, morality or justice with a view from nowhere,
although we can criticize them from within using internal standards of rationality’
(Walzer 1987: 6–7). A communal culture does not have to be monolithic. It is rather
a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct its life together.
Our obligations are always deeply coloured by a local ethos. Ethics can still, though,
be shaped by rational debate. In the best case scenario, communal identity flows from
this rational reflection. However, it is still our prior obligations and loyalties, which
give substance to citizenship and justice concerns.
Of course, the above outline does not mean that all communitarian thinkers are
indifferent or critical of all forms of universalism. For example, Michael Walzer has
argued for a thin version of universal morality, embodying, for example, expect-
ations not to be deceived, treated with gross cruelty, or murdered. These might be
thought of as ‘limit conditions’— concerning conditions of birth, death, child rearing,
and the like—which every human culture must engage with. These limit conditions
would constitute the cross cultural requirements of justice. They would hold for all
human beings, by the very fact that theyarehuman. They would also constitute
basic universal norms acknowledged by all. They would thus hold for widely different
states. Walzer argues that the ‘thicker’ morality, embedded in all societies and social